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See Jane Read the Bible:
Does the Establishment Clause Allow School
Choice Programs to Include Sectarian Schools
After Agostini v. Felton?
Ellen M. Wasilausky"
I. Introduction
Aaron Bagley's parents live in the small town of Raymond, Maine, which
has too few students to justify operating a public school beyond the elemen-
tary level.1 Consequently, the Bagleys pay an annual tuition of $5500 for their
son to attend a Roman Catholic high school.2 The Bagleys' neighbors bear a
lesser financial burden because they are able to take advantage of the state's
"tuitioning" program.' As part of that program, each town or city that does
not maintain a public secondary school pays the tuition (up to the average cost
of a public school education) of its residents in grades seven through twelve.4
The state-wide program allows the residents of Raymond to choose to send
their children to any school, public or private, as long as the school is not
religiously affiliated.' The town pays $4800 per child toward each child's
tuition at public and nonsectarian private schools in other districts.6 These
schools have tuition rates comparable to that of local religious schools.7
* ThisNote isdedicatedtothememoryofMaryColleenFagan Wasilausky (1950-1992).
The author wishes to thank Professor Ann MacLean Massie, Megan Ward, Christopher Meyer,
and Maureen Walsh for their assistance in the development of this Note. The author would also
like to express her great appreciation to her family, especially Philip and Barbara Wasilausky,
for their constant love and support.
1. Nicole Garnett, Editorial, Religious Schools Excluded Unfairly Under Maine Law:
The Courts Are Asked to Decide a Church-Sponsored School Should Be an Option When a
Town Pays Tuitionfor Its Children, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 31, 1997, at 13A, available
in 1997 WL 12528288.
2. SusanYoung, Lawsuit Challenges Exclusion ofParochial Schools as Choice, BANGOR
DAILYNEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11879734.
3. Garnett, supra note 1.
4. I
5. IM
6. Jason Wolfe & Sarah Ragland, RaymondParents Suefor Tuition to Cheverus: Their
Case Against the State Could Have National Implications and Even Go to the Supreme Court,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 1, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 12582286.
7. Id.
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The school choice program that Maine has implemented is just one of a
wide variety of selective education plans included in the term "school choice,"
all of which encourage or require students and their parents to choose which
school the students will attend The Maine program is an example of
interdistrict choice, a type of school choice program in which tuition funds
follow students and allow these students to cross school district lines to attend
school.9 It is unique, however, in two ways. First, the Maine legislature
chose to include private schools in its program, instead of only public schools
in neighboring districts." Second, the state legislature implemented Maine's
interdistrict choice program out ofnecessity. 2 Small towns such as Raymond
must employ an interdistrict choice program because Maine law requires these
towns to provide an education for their citizens through the secondary school
level. 3 Thus, the question the Bagleys present is: Must Maine's necessary
interdistrict choice program include religious schools?
In recent years, legal scholars have purported to debate the merits and
constitutionality of all school choice programs. However, most of these
scholars have addressed only the merits and constitutionality of school
voucher programs. 4 School voucher programs provide families with a fixed
8. See PETER W. COOKsON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION 14 (1994) (discussing variety of school choice plans and their differ-
ences but noting that all "encourage or require students and their families to become actively
engaged in choosing schools").
9. See id. at 15 (defining interdistrict choice as "[a] plan in which students may cross
district lines to attend school").
10. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (explaining why Maine's interdistrict
choice program is unique).
11. See THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL
CHOICE: A SPECIAL REPORT 2 (1992) [hereinafter CARNEGIE] (stating that interdistrict, or
statewide, choice permits students to attend public schools outside their home district); DAVID
HARMER, SCHOOL CHOICE: WHY YOU NEED IT - How YOU GET IT 85 (1994) (noting that
interdistrict choice allows enrollment in public schools across state).
12. See Young, supra note 2 (stating that Vermont is "the only other state with a tuition
arrangement like Maine's").
13. See Gamett, supra note I (stating that "Maine law requires Raymond to provide for
the education of residents through 12th grade").
14. See, e.g., Cynthia Bright, The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private
Choice and Proposition 174, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 193, 195 (1995) (stating that article will
present Establishment Clause analysis of California's proposed school voucher program); Steven
K. Green, The LegalArgumentAgainstPrivate School Choice, 62 U. CIN.L.REv. 37,43 (1993)
(acknowledging that article is primarily concerned with refuting voucher plans but claiming that
article's analysis is applicable to other choice programs); Harlan A. Loeb & DebbieN. Kaminer,
God, Money, andSchools: VoucherPrograms Impugn the Separation ofChurch and State, 30
J. MARSHALLL. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (stating that article "argues that school voucher programs that
include religious schools are unconstitutional"); Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 28 COLUM.J.L. & SOc. PROBS.423,426-27 (1995) (presenting content
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subsidy for each school-aged child. 5 The families use these subsidies at the
school of the family's choice, public or private, regardless of which schools
would otherwise be available to that family." Unlike interdistrict choice
programs that arise out of need, voucher programs seek to fulfill certain goals.
First, states often propose school voucher programs to promote competition
among private and public schools. 7 In theory, such competition results in
higher quality education because schools improve as they seek to meet the
demands of students and their families."8 Second, states create school voucher
programs to provide educational choices for lower-income families who do
not have access to private schools. 9
Various state legislatures have implemented voucher programs that
include sectarian schools. 0 In recent years, state courts have been debating
of article as dealing with background, policy issues, and constitutional analysis of educational
voucher programs); Jo Ann Bodemer, Note, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing
Constitutional Lemon-Aid From the Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 273, 279-80 (1996)
(stating that note deals with proposed school voucher programs, addresses constitutional issues
raised by such programs, and demonstrates why these programs will reform our schools); David
Futterman, Note, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law andPolitics ofPublic Aid
to Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711, 714 (1993) (stating that note "analyzes school
choice" but describing contents as debate over constitutionality of "tuition vouchers"); Eric
Nasstrom, Casenote, School Vouchers in Minnesota: Confrontingthe WallsSeparatingChurch
andState, 22 WM. MTCHELL L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1996) (stating that casenote examines issue
ofwhether religious schools can participate in voucher programs); PeterJ. Weishaar, Comment,
School Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L. REV. 543, 544-45 (1994)
(stating that comment addresses conflict between "Establishment Clause and school choice
programs," but describing contents as "analyz[ing] the vouchers issue").
15. See Stick, supra note 14, at 427 (defining school voucher plans as involving fixed
subsidies).
16. See id (defining school voucher plans as allowing parental choice of any school,
public or private).
17. See CARNEGIE, supra note 11, at 3-4 (discussing reasons for interest in school choice
programs).
18. See, e.g., id. (discussing belief that competition between schools will result in
improvements in education); COOKSON, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing school choice advocates
and their belief in "the social and educational efficacy of market competition"); Stick, supra
note 14, at 427 (discussing Milton Friedman's theory that educational vouchers would promote
competition between schools and will result in improvements in education).
19. See CARNEGIE, supra note 11, at3 (discussingbeliefthat school choiceprograms give
disadvantaged families increased and better educational opportunities); COOKSON, supra note
8, at 64-68 (discussing significance of voucher plan implemented in Milwaukee to provide
educational choice to children in families at or below 1.75 times federal poverty level).
20. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583, at * 1-*2 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 1, 1997) (describing school voucher, or "scholarship," program that Cleveland
implemented), appeal allowed, 648 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1997); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d
602, 608-09 (Wis. 1998) (describing school voucher program that Milwaukee implemented),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 721 (1999)
the constitutionality of these programs.2' A few scholars have noted that other
types of school choice programs besides voucher programs exist. None of
these scholars, however, have considered the type of interdistrict choice
program implemented out of necessity in rural areas such as Raymond,
Maine.22
In August 1998, a federal district court in Maine considered a lawsuit by
another Maine resident living in the small town of Minot.' The town of
Minot is one of three towns comprising School Union No. 29, which does not
operate its own secondary school.24 The plaintiffs, like the Bagleys, were
unsuccessful in seeking reimbursement for the tuition they paid to a private,
Catholic high school and so they brought a lawsuit against the Maine Com-
missioner of Education.' The court declined to answer the question of
whether Maine could permit its school districts to provide tuition reimburse-
ment to parents who choose to send their children to sectarian private
schools.26 It did, however, in a cursory two-page opinion, find that Maine is
not constitutionally required to extend tuition subsidies to sectarian private
schools and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.27 After
a careful analysis of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence that deals with
aid to religious schools, this Note concludes that the federal district court in
Maine erred in granting summary judgment to the Maine Commissioner of
Education.
This Note considers the constitutionality of including religious schools
in both necessary interdistrict school choice programs and in school voucher
21. SeeSimmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *2 (challenging implementationofscholar-
ship program on grounds that it violates Establishment Clause); Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607
(upholding constitutional challenge to Amended Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, which
allowed participation of sectarian schools); Garnett, supra note 1 (discussing lawsuit filed in
Maine against commissioner of education alleging that state's school choice program violates
parents' First Amendment rights because parents cannot choose to send their children to
religious schools).
22. See MarkJ. BeutlerPublicFundingofSectarianEducation: Establishment andFree
Exercise Clause Implications, 2 GEO.MAsoNINDEP.L.REv. 7,13-16 (1993) (describing several
school choice programs including vouchers, scholarships, and property tax abatements, but
failing to mention interdistrict choice programs in rural areas); Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing
Equality: Religious Freedom andEducational Opportunity Under ConstitutionalFederalism,
15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 113, 149-60 (1996) (discussing state constitutional law as applied
to aid to religious schools and voucher programs in six states and territories, but not discussing
other types of school choice programs).
23. Strout v. Commissioner, 13 F. Supp. 2d 112, 113 (D. Me. 1998).
24. d.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 114.
27. Id.
SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS AND SECTARIAN SCHOOLS 725
programs." In assessing whether a state may constitutionally include reli-
gious schools in a necessary interdistrict school choice program, this Note
analyzes the major Establishment Clause cases that discuss aid to religious
schools.29 Previously, scholars have not dealt with these cases in light of this
type of school choice program. In considering whether a school voucher
program may include religious schools, this Note summarizes scholars'
existing arguments both for and against the inclusion of religious schools."
This Note also applies the Supreme Court's recent decision in Agostini v.
Felton31 to the questions of whether it is constitutional for either or both
necessary interdistrict choice programs and voucher programs to include
religious schools.32
Much of the scholarly and jurisprudential disagreement about the propri-
ety of any school choice program arises from the issue of public funding of
28. See infra Parts 11-11 (discussing constitutionality of including religious schools in
interdistrict choice programs and school voucher programs).
29. See infra Part II (discussing recent Establishment Clause cases and constitutionality
of including religious schools in interdistrict choice programs).
30. See infra Part III (summarizing scholars' arguments both for and against inclusion of
religious schools in school voucher programs).
31. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
32. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (1997) (holding that federally funded
program which sent public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial instruc-
tion to disadvantaged children is not invalid under Establishment Clause). In Agostini, the
Supreme Court considered whether the Establishment Clause barred New York City from
sending public school teachers into religious schools to provide remedial education to disadvan-
taged children under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Id
Previously, in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), the Court had held that such programs
created excessive entanglement of church and state and thus violated the Establishment Clause.
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004-05. Since that decision, New York City had provided Title I
services at leased sites, in mobile units, and via computer, resulting in significant expenditure
of funds to comply with Aguilar. Id at 2005. The Agostini Court found that Establishment
Clause cases subsequent to Aguilar had eroded that holding because the Court undermined the
assumptions on which it had relied in deciding Aguilar and its companion case, SchoolDistrict
of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017. First, the Court
decided that the assumption that any public employee working on the premises of a religious
school inculcated religion in her work was no longer valid. Id. at 2010. The presence of public
school employees on the grounds of a religious school does not necessarily create a symbolic
union between church and state. Id at 2011. Second, the Court reasoned that it previously had
departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all government aid that assists religious schools is
invalid. Id. Finally, the Court determined that not all entanglements between church and state
have the effect of advancing religion. Id. at 2015. The Court stated that if the assumption that
public employees in religious schools inculcate religion is no longer valid, then New York
City's Title I program no longer requires pervasive monitoring and therefore does not create
excessive entanglement. Id. at2016. Consequently, the Court determined thatNewYork City's
Title I program did not "run afoul of any of the three primary criteria we currently use to
evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion." Id.
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religious schools.33 The constitutional debate over school choice centers
largely on Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Accordingly, judges and
scholars have argued about the application of the Lemon test, the Supreme
Court's often-used test for determining whether a publicly-funded program
that directly or indirectly aids religious schools violates the Establishment
Clause. 5 Nonetheless, the types of programs this Note discusses require
separate applications of Establishment Clause jurisprudence because of the
difference in the functioning of the programs.36 Some constitutional analysis
applies to all types of school choice programs, such as the assessment of
recent changes in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Even before the
Supreme Court's Agostini decision became the focus of constitutional debate
in 1997," advocates of the inclusion of sectarian schools in school choice
programs suggested that earlier Supreme Court decisions redefined the
relationship between church and state.3" These advocates have maintained
33. See generally Bright, supra note 14 (discussing constitutionality of Proposition 174
that would have allowed government money to flow to religious schools in California school
choice program); Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 14 (discussing inclusion of religious schools in
voucher plans and whether such programs violate both federal and state constitutions); Stick,
supra note 14 (examining policy and constitutional issues involved in debate over inclusion of
sectarian schools in voucher programs).
34. See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 14, at 5 (stating that "voucher controversy centers
around the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and parallel provisions in state constitu-
tions").
35. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing test for assessing whether
statute violates Establishment Clause created by Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971)).
36. See infra Parts II-III (discussing application of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
to necessary interdistrict choice programs and to school voucher plans).
37. See, e.g.,Leading Cases, 1 1HARv.L.REv. 197,286-89(1997) (discussingproblem-
atic approach of Supreme Court in deciding Agostini and further damage that Agostini has
caused to separation of church and state and to Establishment Clause); Edward Felsenthal, High
Court Rules Public Teachers Can Work in Religious Schools, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1997, at
B8 (stating that Supreme Court's decision in Agostini has encouraged school voucher advo-
cates); Art Moore, Justices VoidRuling onRemedial Teachers, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 11,
1997, at 53, available in 1997 WL 8863269 (discussing belief of school voucher advocates that
Agostini provides "ammunition" for their cause).
38. See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, School Vouchers and the UnitedStates Constitution, in
THE SCHOOL-CHOICE CONTROvERSY: WHATIS CONSTITUTIONAL? 51,65 (James W. Skillen ed.,
1993) (stating thatUnited States Constitution supports rightto choose either religious or secular
education when financial terms are neutral); Viteritti, supra note 22, at 116-17 (concluding that
tuition assistance programs that allow parents to send their children to religious schools are
constitutional); Bodemer, supranote 14, at311 (concluding that Supreme Court's interpretation
of Establishment Clause would allow implementation of school voucher programs); Nasstrom,
supra note 14, at 1092 (asserting that Supreme Court's "current construction and application
of Lemon to voucher legislation permitting parochial schools' participation would not result in
an Establishment Clause violation").
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that Agostini confirms that school voucher programs can be constitutional.39
Opponents of school choice programs that include sectarian schools have
asserted that prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence forbids this extensive
involvement of church and state4' and that Agostini does not change the
constitutionality of such programs.4" Agostini has varying effects on the
constitutionality of the different types of school choice programs that include
religious schools. It is most significant, however, because it alters the applica-
tion of the Lemon test to the question of whether a government program can
aid a religious institution.42
Part II of this Note discusses whether the Constitution permits or requires
interdistrict choice programs, such as the one implemented in Maine, to
include religious schools. Part H's discussion includes an examination of
recent Establishment Clause opinions that address the issue of aid to religious
schools, particularly the Supreme Court's reasoning in Agostini. Part HI
addresses the more difficult questions of whether the Constitution permits or
requires cities to include religious schools in voucher programs. In particular,
Part HI considers scholars' constitutional arguments for and against voucher
programs that include religious schools. Part H also considers how the
Supreme Court's reasoning inAgostini affects these arguments.
Finally, Part IV concludes that the Constitution not only permits but re-
quires necessary interdistrict choice programs in rural districts that do not
maintain public schools to include sectarian schools when the program also
39. See Joan Biskupic & Laurie Goodstein, Church-State Divide Narrowed; Taxpayer-
Funded Teachers Allowed to Tutor in Parochial Schools, WASH. POST, June 24, 1997, at Al
(stating that advocate of inclusion of religious schools in school voucher programs asserts that
Agostini "confirms that vouchers can be constitutional"); Daniel Wise, Parochial School
Teaching May Be Paid by Federal Funds, 217 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1997) (noting advocate's assertion
that, through Agostini, "the Court has provided states with a 'blueprint' for the adoption of
vouchers ... which can withstand constitutional scrutiny").
40. See Bright, supra note 14, at 228 (concluding that state funds which flow to religious
schools as result of voucher plans reach those religious schools because of state action; there
is no guarantee that religious schools will use such funds for only secular purposes; and such
programs are unconstitutional); Green, supra note 14, at 42-43 (discussing Establishment
Clause concerns that arise in school choice programs and asserting that voucher plans and all
school choice proposals are unconstitutional).
41. See, e.g., Felsenthal, supra note 37, at B8 (noting that voucher opponents viewed
Agostini as "remain[ing] wary of direct subsidies forreligious schools"); Tamara Henry & Lori
Sham, Schools Decision CouldAffect Rulings on Vouchers, USA TODAY, June 24, 1997, at 3A
(noting thatvoucher opponents "are certain there's no precedent [inAgostin] to allow programs
that will bridge the separation between church and state"); Wise, supra note 39, at 1 (stating that
one school voucher opponent believes that Agostini "'leaves both sides where we were' on
vouchers").
42. See infra notes 201-04, 213-15, 315-38 and accompanying text (describing impact
of Agostini on constitutionality of including religious schools in necessary interdistrict choice
programs and school voucher plans).
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includes nonsectarian private schools. The Supreme Court's reasoning in
Agostini impacts and reinforces this conclusion and adds weight to existing
Establishment Clause decisions that support the cause of school choice advo-
cates in Maine who desire such a change.43 PartIV also concludes thatthe Con-
stitution permits the inclusion of religious schools in school voucher systems.
Agostini adds significant new support to existing arguments for the constitu-
tionality of permitting religious schools to participate in voucher programs.'
Constitutional jurisprudence, however, does not require that school voucher
systems include religious schools, even after the Agostini decision.45
II. Necessary Interdistrict Choice Programs and the
Inclusion of Religious Schools
Maine's necessary interdistrict choice program currently applies to
approximately 140 rural towns. During the 1996 school year, a state statute
required that these Maine towns pay the tuition of approximately 13,000
students, forty percent of whom attended private, nonsectarian schools.4" The
applicable state statute, Maine Statute title 20-A, § 5204 states that a school
district that does not provide a secondary school for its students must pay the
tuition required for its students to attend an approved private school, a public
school in aneighboring district, oran approved public school in another county
or state.48 Read in isolation, § 5204 permits students to attend any private
school.49 However, Maine Statute title 20-A, § 2951 limits § 5204 because it
provides that the state will approve a private school to receive government
funds for tuition purposes only if it is not a religious school.50
43. See infra Part II.E (analyzing impact of Agostini on argument that inclusion of
religious schools in necessary interdistrict choice programs is constitutional).
44. See infra Part III.C (discussing impact ofAgostini on existing arguments for constitu-
tionality of permitting religious schools to participate in voucher programs).
45. See infra Part III.D (concluding that Agostini does not require voucher programs to
include religious schools).
46. Young, supra note 2.
47. Id
48. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (4) (West 1993). Subsection 4 states:
Secondary students whose parents reside in a unit which neither maintains a
secondary school nor contracts for secondary school privileges may attend a private
school approved for tuition purposes, a public school in an adjoining unit which
accepts tuition students, or a school approved for tuition purposes in another state
or country .... The school administrative unit where the students' parents reside
shall pay tuition in the amount up to the legal tuition rate as defined in Chapter 219.
Id.
49. Id.
50. Id § 2951. Section 2951 states: "A private secondary school may be approved for
728
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On July 31, 1997, the Bagleys and four other families from the town of
Raymond filed a lawsuit against Maine's Commissioner of Education chal-
lenging Maine's interdistrict school choice law.5" The Bagleys claimed that
the state's school choice plan violates the First Amendment because it ex-
cludes parochial schools.52 Advocates ofthe inclusion of sectarian schools in
school choice programs have asserted that the time was right for such a
lawsuit. 3 According to many school choice advocates in Maine, the Bagleys'
lawsuit is particularly appropriate because the Supreme Court's decision in
Agostini signals the blurring of the line separating church and state and
provides an ample basis to support their argument that the state should allow
Maine residents to use state tuition funds to attend religious schools.5'
As originally instituted in 1903, Maine's school choice program did
include parochial schools.55 In 1980, however, the Maine Attorney General's
Office determined that spending public funds on religious education was an
unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment.56 Accordingly, the Maine legislature amended the law to exclude the
expenditure of public funds to religious schools.57 However, recent United
States Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases that deal with public fund-
ing of religious education demonstrate that the Constitution permits Maine's
interdistrict choice program to include religious schools.5
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment defines the nature of
the relationship that is to exist between religion and government: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... ."" In effect,
the receipt of public funds for tuition purposes only if it... [i]s a nonsectarian school in
accordance with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution .... " Id.
51. See Wolfe & Ragland, supra note 6 (stating thatfive families filed suit in Cumberland
County Superior Court in Maine).
52. See Garnett, supra note I (stating that parents' lawsuit asserts that Maine's practice
violates First Amendment).
53. Seeiad (discussing SupremeCourt'srecentdecisioninAgostiniandarguingthatMaine
should "seize the opportunity" to change its school choice program to include religious schools).
54. See Young, supra note 2 (discussing Agostini and explaining that Supreme Court's
decision "indicates the separation of church and state is becoming blurred").
55. See id (discussing Maine school choice law and its inception in 1903).
56. Me. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-2 (1980).
57. See Gamett, supranote I (discussingMaine school choice law, which state legislature
amended in 1981 after Maine Attorney General wrote opinion finding it unconstitutional to
include religious schools in Maine's school choice program).
58. See infra notes 80-156 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court's decisions
in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), Witters v. Washington Department ofServicesfor the
Blind, 474U.S. 481 (1986), andZobrestv. CatalinaFoothills SchoolDistrict, 509U.S. 1(1993)).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. In 1947, this clause became applicable to the states
throughtheFourteenthAmendmentinEversonv. BoardofEducation, 330 U.S. 1,15-16(1947).
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the Establishment Clause maintains the separation of church and state.' ° Just
as then-Maine Attorney General Richard S. Cohen believed when he deter-
mined in 1980 that the state's school choice program was unconstitutional,61
the primary argument against subsidization of religious schools through
school choice programs is the belief that such subsidization violates the
Establishment Clause.62
A. Lemon v. Kurtzman
In 1971, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of aid to religious
schools in Lemon v. Kurtzman63 and created its now-famous three-prong test
for determining when government funds may properly benefit religious
institutions under the Establishment Clause.' The Court noted the difficulty
60. See Futterman, supra note 14, at 712 (discussing historical background of First
Amendment and religion clauses).
61. See Me. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-2 (concluding that Maine's practice of paying tuition
for students at sectarian schools was unconstitutional).
62. See Futterman, supra note 14, at 714 (noting that debate over school choice has
focused primarily on critics' contention that government funding of private religious schools
violates Establishment Clause).
63. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
64. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (holding that two state statutes
providing aid to religious schools are unconstitutional). In Lemon, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute under which the state paid teachers in
nonpublic schools a supplement equal to 15% of their annual salary if, among other criteria,
they agreed to teach only secular subjects. Id at 607-08. The Court also considered the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that provided financial support to nonpublic schools
through reimbursement for costs related to secular activities. Id. at 609-10. The Lemon Court
recognized "the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions" against laws "respect-
ing" religion and outlined a three-pronged test for the Court to use in determining the constitu-
tionality of such statutes. Id. at 612-13. First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second,
its primary effect must not advance nor inhibit religion; and third, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). Applying this test, the Court determined that the legislatures of Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania had the valid secular purposes of intending to enhance the quality of
secular education through financial support of all schools. Id. at 613. The Court declined to
decide whether the primary effect of the statutes was to advance or to prohibit religion because
both statutes failed the third prong of the test. Id at 613-14. The Rhode Island statute involved
excessive entanglement between government and religion because the religious activities of
parochial schools gave rise to careful and extensive surveillance and record-keeping by state
authorities in order to ensure that state aid benefitted only secular education. Id. at 616-17. The
Court determined that the state would have to continue such pervasive monitoring because a
"dedicated religious person" is likely to experience difficulty in remaining "religiously neutral"
even when teaching secular subjects. Id at 618. The Pennsylvania statute also caused exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion because it provided state financial aid
directly to religious schools and thus also required extensive monitoring to ensure that secular
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in identifying a law "respecting" the establishment of religion; therefore, it
articulated three important criteria to identify statutes that do not violate the
Establishment Clause.65 First, a statute must have a secular purpose.' Second,
the primary effect of the statute must be one that neither aids nor inhibits
religion.6 7 Third, the statute must not create "excessive government entangle-
ment with religion."6"
In Lemon, the Court found unconstitutional two state statutes that sought
to subsidize the costs of private and parochial education through reimburse-
ments for secular activities and teacher salary supplements.69 Applying its
three-prong test, the Court first determined that the statutes had a clearly
demonstrated secular purpose of enhancing the quality of secular education.70
Second, the Court declined to decide whether the statutes had the primary
effect of inhibiting or advancing the religious schools. 7' Instead, the Court
moved on to the third prong and found that the two statutes resulted in exces-
sive administrative entanglement between church and state because the
schools receiving aid had the primary purpose of reinforcing religious faith
and because both statutes required extensive surveillance measures to ensure
that the schools used state funds only for secular purposes.
72
The Court's reasoning resulted in a "Catch-22."'  Although the effects
prong requires that the government monitor any program involving aid to
religious institutions, monitoring itself constitutes an excessive entanglement
and therefore violates the third prong of Lemon.74 In the years immediately
and religious expenditures were kept separate and that aid went only to secular costs. Id. at 621-
22. The Court also noted that both state statutes had the potential to cause political divisiveness
along religious lines, an "evil" against which the First Amendment was to protect Id. at 622.
Consequently, the Lemon Court held that the state statutes were in violation ofthe First Amend-




68. Id at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
69. Id at 607-10.
70. Id at 613-14.
71. Id.
72. See id. at615-25 (discussing entanglementbetweenchurchandstatecausedbyRhode
Island and Pennsylvania state statutes).
73. SeeBeutler, supra note22, at22-23 (discussing Supreme Court's reasoning inLemon
and effects of establishing three-prong Lemon test). In concluding his analysis of Lemon,
Beutler states: "Aid to sectarian schools must be vigorously policed lest it be put to sectarian
use and thereby violate the effects test. Yet this supervision constitutes an impermissible
entanglement. That of course leaves only one solution: excludereligious schools from receiving
government aid altogether." Id
74. Id.
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following Lemon, this interpretation of the test led the Court to prohibit
various types of aid to religious schools.75 One such case was Committee for
Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,76 in which the Court struck
down three programs that only provided aid to private schools and to parents
whose children were attending private schools.7 Soon afterNyquist, however,
the Court began to waver in its application of the Lemon test in a number of
cases that challenged aid to religious education.78 The Supreme Court's firm
75. See Sloanv. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825,830-32 (1973) (holdingthatPennsylvania's partial
tuition reimbursement program for parents with children attending nonpublic schools furnished
incentive for parents to send their children to religious schools, advancing religion, and was,
therefore, unconstitutional); Committee forPub. Educ. &Religious Liberty v.Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756,798 (1973) (holding that New York tax programs which provide aid to nonpublic schools
have impermissible effect of advancing religion and are unconstitutional); Levitt v. Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1973) (finding unconstitutional
reimbursement of parochial schools for expenses for services required by state because secular
activities receiving aid are not distinguishable from sectarian activities); see also Viteritti, supra
note 22, at 133 -35 (discussing Court's opinion in Nyquist and its relation to other cases decided
during 1973 term).
76. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
77. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798
(1973) (holding that New York tax programs which provide aid to nonpublic schools have
impermissible effect of advancing religion and are unconstitutional). In Nyquist, the Court
addressed New York's amendments to the state tax laws that established three financial aid
programs for private schools: direct money grants for maintenance, tuition grants, and a tax
benefit program. Id. at 761-68. The Nyquist Court applied the three-part Lemon test to the
three programs. Id. at 772-73. The Court determined that New York's programs had a valid
secular purpose in wanting to preserve safe educational environments in its private schools and
in being concerned about the overburdened public school system. Id. at 773. The maintenance
and repair provisions, however, failed to pass the second part of the Lemon test because no
provision existed to ensure that the school did not use the direct money grants in connection
with any religious activity. Id. at 774. The provisions constituted direct subsidy of religious
institutions and had the primary effect of impermissibly advancing religion. Id The Court
found that the tuition reimbursement program also failed the "effect" test because the state could
not ensure that schools used the aid for only secular purposes, especially when given to parents
instead of schools. Id at 780-83. Also, the Court decided that the tax credits program failed
the "effect" test because it had the effect of advancing religion as it provided financial benefit
to parents who chose to send their children to sectarian schools. Id at 789-94. The Court
decided that it need not consider the entanglement prong because it found that the challenged
provisions had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. Id at 794. Consequently, the
Court concluded that the New York tax provisions violated the Establishment Clause and were
thus unconstitutional. Id at 795-98.
78. See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools -An
Update, 75 CAL. L.REv. 5, 5-6 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court's application of three prongs
of Lemon test in cases subsequent to Lemon and determining that such decisions contain
conceptual problems); Bodemer, supra note 14, at 297-99 (discussing likelihood of school
voucher program satisfying three prongs of Lemon test, inconsistencies of Supreme Court in
applying Lemon test, and inferring from Court dicta that test may be in need of revision).
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stand on the strict division between church and state began to soften when, in
1980, the Court upheld a New York law that allocated state funds to both
private and parochial schools as areimbursement for expenditures on required
state examinations and on the collection of attendance data.79
B. Mueller v. Allen
Three years later, in Mueller v. Allen,8" the Court took an even greater
step toward allowing funding of religious education when it upheld a Minne-
sota statute that granted parents of public, private, and parochial schoolchil-
dren tax deductions for reasonable educational expenses, including tuition.8'
79. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61
(1980) (holdingNewYork plan allocating funds to private and parochial schools for administra-
tion of state examinations does not suggest excessive entanglement and thus is constitutional).
80. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
81. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983) (holding that Minnesota statute
allowing taxpayers to deduct certain expenses incurred in providing for their children's educa-
tion at nonsectarian and sectarian schools does not violate Establishment Clause and is constitu-
tional). In Mueller, the Supreme Court considered a Minnesota statute that permits state tax-
payers to deduct from gross income actual expenses related to "tuition, textbooks, and transpor-
tation" incurred in the education of their children. Id. at 391. The Mueller Court considered
whether this program bore greater resemblance to the types of assistance that it previously had
struck down in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), or to programs that it had upheld, such as in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Il at 393-94. The Court
applied the three-part test developed in Lemon but acknowledged that the test "provides no more
than [a] helpful signpos[t] in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges." Id. at 394
(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (alterations in original)). The Court
declined to spend much time on the question of whether the tax deduction had a secular purpose
and quickly decided that "[a] State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses
incurred by parents regardless of the type of schools their children attend evidences a purpose
that is both secular and understandable." lId at 395. In addition, the Court noted that a strong
public interest existed in having healthy private schools as they provide competition to public
schools and relieve some tax burden. Id, In determining whether the Minnesota statute had the
primary effect of advancing religion, the Court looked to the nature of the tax deduction and
noted that it was available to all parents, including those whose children attended public
schools. Id. at 397. This factor led the Court to believe that the Minnesota statute was "vitally
different" from the tax scheme struck down in Nyquist and was more similar to the programs
upheldin Allen and Everson. Id. at398. Also, the Court stated thatthe Minnesota arrangement
reduced Establishment Clause concerns because public funds became available to private and
parochial schools only as a result of numerous private choices of parents. Id. at 399. The Court
disagreed with the petitioners' argument that in application the statute primarily benefitted
religious institutions because most parents of public school children incurred little, if any,
tuition expenses. Id. at 400-01. The statute was facially neutral because parents of public
school students could take advantage of the statute by making deductions for things such as
transportation costs, summer school tuition, and various equipment costs. Id. The Court
refused to consider whether such parents actually took advantage of the statute. Id. Finally, the
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The Court applied the Lemon test and determined that the Minnesota statute
satisfied all three parts of the test.82 First, the Court determined that the
statute clearly served a secular purpose in ensuring that the children ofMinne-
sota were well-educated by defraying costs that parents incurred in providing
education. 3 Similarly, the interdistrict choice program implemented in Maine
also has a secular purpose in that it serves to provide an education to those
children whose parents reside in sparsely populated areas."
Second, the Mueller Court found that the Minnesota statute did not
have the primary effect of advancing religion because any parent, not just
those whose children attended private schools, could benefit from the tax
deductions.8 5 Thus, this facially neutral statute provided no incentive for
parents to send their children to parochial schools rather than nonparochial
schools.8 6 The Court determined that facial neutrality was enough to satisfy
the effects prong, despite the fact that, in reality, parents of children who
attended religious schools made ninety-six percent of the Minnesota tax
deductions."7
As in Mueller, the Maine statute that defines the interdistrict program is
facially neutral in that all schoolchildren in the relevant area benefit from the
opportunity to choose a school in another administrative unit of the state."
The Maine statute, like the one in Mueller, therefore provides no incentive for
a parent to send his or her child to a religious school over a nonreligious
Mueller Court had "no difficulty" concluding that the Minnesota statute did not involve
excessive entanglement because the only surveillance possibly necessary was deciding whether
certain textbooks qualified for the deduction, and the Court had already approved of that type
of decision in earlier cases. Id. at 403. Consequently, the Supreme Court found that the
Minnesota statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id at 403-04.
82. See id. at 394-403 (discussing reasoning of court in determining how statute satisfies
all three prongs of Lemon test).
83. Id at 395.
84. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (West 1993) (stating that students whose
parents live in administrative units without public schools can attend school outside their unit).
85. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that 96% of total taxpayers who are
eligible for tuition deduction send their children to religious schools); see also Choper, supra
note 78, at 9 (contending that Court's reasoning that when government assistance is neutral,
effect is not to advance religion "does not survive closer analysis"). Choper argues that in
reality, only parents who send their children to nonpublic schools benefit from the tax deduc-
tions and that the true primary effect of the statute was to advance religion. Id. at 9-10.
88. See M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (stating that all "[s]econdary students
whose parents reside in a unit which neither maintains a secondary school nor contracts for
secondary school privileges" may attend a school in another unit and "unit where the students'
parents reside" will pay tuition); supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing facial
neutrality of statute in Mueller).
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school. Furthermore, the practical result ofthe statute is not to favor families
who send their children to sectarian schools, as it was in Mueller.89 Maine's
interdistrict choice program applies to 140 towns that do not provide second-
ary schools for their residents. However, Maine school choice advocates
estimate that the program would affect fewer than one hundred families if it
included sectarian schools."° Although the Court found similar facial neutral-
ity to be sufficient to support constitutionality in Mueller, if the Maine pro-
gram included religious schools, the statute would also have aneutral practical
effect.9'
In determining that the tax deductions did not have the primary effect of
advancing religion, the Mueller Court also viewed as important the role of the
parent in the distribution of government aid to public, private, and parochial
schools.' The fact that public funds only become available to religious
schools after numerous private choices by parents was a material consider-
ation in the Court's Establishment Clause analysis.93 The state did not require
that parents first decide to send their children to religious schools before they
could receive aid and, therefore, did not induce parents to choose religious
schools.
94
Similarly, if the Maine statute included religious schools and allowed
those schools to receive state tuition money, that money would reach religious
schools only after a private and independent family choice.95 The current
statute clearly states that each student has the option of choosing a private or
public school.' The same options would be present if the statute included
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing practical effect of ruling in
Mueller).
90. See Young, supra note 2 (discussing effect of court ruling in Raymond families'
favor).
91. Seesupranote 87 and accompanying text (discussing that Court found facial neutral-
ity of statute sufficient).
92. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
93. Id (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
781 (1973)).
94. See id. (stating that "no 'imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed to have been
conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally" by Minnesota statute (quoting
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981))); see also Choper, supra note 78, at 10 (noting
that Mueller upheld statute because "state is not putting its imprimatur on the parochial school;
the parents make the decision, not the state").
95. See Gamett supra note 1 (stating that ifMaine's tuitioning system included religious
schools, state funds would only reach religious school as result of independent choice).
96. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (West 1993) (stating that "[s]econdary
students... may attend a private school approved for tuition purposes, a public school in an
adjoining unit which accepts tuition students, or a school approved for tuition purposes in
another state or country").
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religious schools. The government pays a student's tuition because he or she
resides in an area that does not maintain a public school, not because of the
type of school the student chooses. 97 Therefore, the statute does not induce
the student or parent to make a particular choice.
Finally, the Mueller Court quickly determined that the Minnesota statute
did not create an excessive entanglement between church and state.9 There
was no need for extensive surveillance and, therefore, the statute satisfied this
part of the Lemon test." A court might distinguish Maine's interdistrict
choice program from the tax deduction plan in Mueller with regard to this
prong of the Lemon test because the Maine statute would provide a greater
benefit, in the form of all or most of the students' tuitions, to the families
involved.1" Subsequent cases, however, have altered or virtually dismissed
the entanglement prong of the Lemon test. 1 ' Even in Mueller, the Court
called the Lemon test "no more than [a] helpful signpos[t]" in deciding Estab-
lishment Clause issues, suggesting that the Lemon test is not as definitive as
the Court once thought it to be."02 Although Maine's interdistrict choice
program may fail an entanglement prong, this is a moot point if the Court no
longer recognizes the efficacy of this prong of the Lemon test.03
97. See id (stating that secondary students residing in district that does not maintain
public school may attend public or private school and district where student resides shall pay
tuition). The statute provides no other requirements that a student must fulfill in order for the
district to pay his or her tuition. Id
98. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 391 (stating that tax deduction under Minnesota statute may not exceed
$500 per dependent in elementary school and $700 per dependent in secondary school). The
Maine statute provides for a district to pay a student's tuition "up to the legal tuition rate." ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204.
101. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010-16 (1997) (discussing erosion of
assumptions Supreme Court had relied upon in prior cases and asserting that such erosion leads
to conclusion that monitoring of church-state relations, and thus excessive entanglement, is not
always present when religious schools and government come into contact); Witters v. Washing-
ton Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 n.5 (1986) (declining to "address the
'entanglement' issue"). SeegenerallyZobrestv. CatalinaFoothills Sch. Dist. 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(failing to address excessive entanglement prong of Lemon test in majority's opinion).
102. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394 (alterations in original) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 741 (1973)); see Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses,
Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151,
168-69 (1987) (discussing impact of Mueller on evolution of Lemon test and Establishment
Clause).
103. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (discussing change in application of
Lemon test by Court in Agostint. In Agostini, the Court determined that it should treat the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test as simply an aspect of the effects prong. Agostini, 117
S. Ct. at 2015.
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C. Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,"' the
Supreme Court once again considered the question of indirect aid to religious
schools.' ° The Court in Witters concluded that the state must provide a
visually-impaired student with state aid to attend a religious school and that
such aid does not violate the Establishment Clause"° despite the fact that the
state aid clearly supported the student's religious education. 0 7 In making its
decision, the Court purported to use the Lemon test.' 8 Nonetheless, the Court
declined to address the excessive entanglement prong of the test."°
First, the program had a clear secular purpose because the state designed
it to assist the visually handicapped by providing aid for vocational rehabilita-
tive services."0 Second, the program did not violate the effects prong simply
because state funds reached a religious institution."' The Court equated the
state aid to a government employee donating his state paycheck to a religious
104. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
105. See Wittersv. Washington Dep't of Servs. for theBlind, 474 U.S. 481,489-90 (1986)
(determining that extension of aid under state program to finance visually-impaired student's
training at Christian college does not advance religion and thus does not violate Establishment
Clause). In Witters, the Court considered the Washington Commission for the Blind's denial
of aid to a visually-impaired student who was attending a bible college in preparation for a
career as a pastor or other religious administrator. Id. at 483. The Witters Court used the three-
part Lemon test to guide its analysis, noting that in Lemon itself the Court called this area of the
law "extraordinarily sensitive." Id at 485 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971)). First, the Court found that the Washington program had an "unmistakably secular
purpose" in that it assisted the visually-handicapped in receiving vocational training. Id at 485-
86. In regards to the second prong, the "primary effect" test, the Court found its analysis to be
more difficult. Id at 486. The Court found, however, that the Washington program presented
a situation similarto that of a state employee who receives a paycheck from the government and
donates all or part of it to a religious institution. Id. at 486-87. The Court did not find the aid
provided by the Washington program to be similar to direct aid to a religious school in the form
of a direct subsidy because it only reached a religious school as a result of an independent and
private choice. Id. at 488. The granting of aid neither constituted a state endorsement of
religion nor created an incentive for students to attend religious schools because the same
benefits were available for use at secular schools. Id at 488-89. The Court declined to address
the "excessive entanglement" prong based on the record available. Id. at489n.5. Consequently,
the Court rejected the claim that a grant of aid for a visually-impaired student to use toward
religious education violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 489-90.
106. See id (stating that Establishment Clause does not prohibit Washington program).
107. See Stick, supra note 14, at 447 (discussing Supreme Court's analysis in Witters and
noting that "state assistance clearly supported religious education").
108. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 485 (stating that test set forth in Lemon guided Court).
109. See id. at 489 n.5 (declining to address excessive entanglement prong of Lemon test).
110. Id at 485-86.
111. 1d at486.
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institution and stated that the government could issue the paycheck even if it
knew that government money would aid religion as a result."' The aid did not
have the effect of a direct subsidy; rather, state money would flow to a reli-
gious school only as a consequence of private and independent choice.'
The inclusion of religious schools in Maine's necessary interdistrict
choice program would be constitutional under Witters. As discussed in Part
U.B, if Maine's interdistrict choice program included religious schools, the
schools would benefit from state funds only after private and independent
choices by students and their families."' Although each town or district
would be aware that some of its tuition money reached religious institutions,
the Maine program, like that in Witters, is neutral and based on private choice,
and therefore is analogous to the government paycheck donated to a religious
institution. The government would have no role in the selection of a school
for each child."'
Also, the government made the aid in Witters available to all students
who qualified, based upon their visual impairment and without regard to the
type of institution benefitted. Therefore, the program provided no financial
incentive for a student to pursue a religious education." 6 The Court made a
point of noting that aid recipients had a variety of opportunities and a greater
number of secular, rather than sectarian, careers available to them."7 Finally,
the Court determined that because nothing in the record indicated that a large
portion of aid would ultimately fund religious education, the program did not
function to subsidize religion." 8
As in Witters, Maine distributes tuition funds based upon a specific need.
In Maine, the state provides all students who do not have access to a local
public secondary school with tuition money for a secondary education at
another school. Similarly, Washington's program in Witters provided aid to
112. Id. at 486-87.
113. Id. at 487-88. In evaluating whether the Washington program had the effect of a
direct subsidy, the Court stated: "Any aid provided under Washington's program thatultimately
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of aid recipients." Id. at 487.
114. See Garnett, supranote 1 (stating that ifMaine's tuitioning system included religious
schools, state funds would only reach religious school as result of independent choice).
115. See id. (stating that "[t]he town plays no role in selecting the school, parents are free
to select any school. . . as long as it meets basic academic requirements").
116. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483, 488-89.
117. Id at488.
118. Id The Court stated that "nothing in the record indicates that, if petitioner succeeds,
any significant portion of the aid expended under the Washington program as a whole will end
up flowing to religious education. The function of the Washington program is hardly 'to
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions."' Id. (quoting Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973)).
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all visually handicapped students." 9 In each case, the state did not provide aid
based on the type of school; therefore, no incentive existed to choose a
religious school. Also, the Maine statute states that a student choosing a
secondary school would have a greater number of secular opportunities
because the student can choose to attend a nonsectarian private school, a
public school in a nearby district, or an approved school in another state or
county. 2° The addition of sectarian schools to the list merely creates one
additional choice.
The Court in Witters found it significant that only a small portion of aid
would ultimately fund religious education.' In Maine, advocates of the
inclusion of religious schools in the state's interdistrict choice program argue
that such an addition would affect only a small number of families.'" Neither
program, therefore, functions or would function to promote religion because
only a small amount of aid would reach religious schools.
The implementation of the Witters program is different than the imple-
mentation of Maine's interdistrict choice program. In Witters, the Court
emphasized that Washington gave the aid directly to the visually handicapped
student." In Maine, each school district without a secondary school pays the
tuition of its residents directly to the school the family chooses.24 This
distinction, although not central to the Witters decision,"25 did aid the majority
in deciding that the Washington program was not equivalent to a direct
subsidy and therefore did not create a financial incentive to pursue a religious
119. See id. at 483 (discussing authorization of statute to provide education or training to
assist visually handicapped persons and petitioner's eligibility); see also M. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20-A, § 5204 (West 1993) (stating that those secondary students whose parents reside in
district which does not provide secondary school may attend another school).
120. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204(4) (stating that "[s]econdary students...
may attend a private school approved for tuition purposes, a public school in an adjoining unit
which accepts tuition students, or a school approved for tuition purposes in another state or
country").
121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing portion of aid thatwould reach
religious education and function of Washington program).
122. See Young, supra note 2 (discussing effect of positive ruling in Raymond families'
case).
123. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (stating that "vocational assistance provided under the
Washington program is paid directly to the student, who transmits it to the educational institu-
tion of his or her choice").
124. See M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (4) (stating that "[t]he school administra-
tive unit where the students' parents reside shall pay tuition"); Gamett, supra note 1 (stating that
"[tihe town then pays tuition (up to the average cost of a public education) to the school that
the parents choose").
125. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 137 (describing Supreme Court's focus in Witters).
Professor Viteritti states that the Court's reasoning focused on the fact that "the financial aid
in question was made available to all students, not just those in sectarian schools." I
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education.'26 Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment in Witters, failed to
mention the fact that the government pays the student directly under Washing-
ton's program and instead focused on the neutrality of the program and the
aspect of private choice.'27 The importance of such a distinction in programs
that include religious schools is also open to question after analyzing the
Court's decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District. '
126. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88 (discussing aspects of Washington's program that
show aid does not amount to direct subsidy).
127. Id, at 490-92 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Viteritti, supra note 22, at 137-38
(stating that Justice Powell "set a new standard" for cases involving review of state aid to
religious education based on facial neutrality of program, equal availability of funds to all
public and private schools, and flow of aid to religious schools based on private choice).
128. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993) (holding that
Establishment Clause does not prevent school district from providing child with disability with
interpreterto facilitate his education at sectarian school). In Zobrest, the Court considered a deaf
high school student's request for his school district to supply him with an interpreter, pursuant
to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), at his Catholic high school. Id. at 3.
The Zobrest Court first acknowledged that the case presented only constitutional questions and
therefore "the prudential rule" of avoiding such questions did not apply. Id, at 7-8. Turning to
the merits of the constitutional claim, the Court stated that government programs that neutrally
provide benefits to abroad group ofcitizens are not subjectto an Establishment Clause challenge
just because sectarian institutions also receive a financial benefit. Id. at 8. The Court explained
its recent holdings in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) and Witters v. Washington Depart-
ment of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), emphasizing that in both of these cases
states made public funds available to a broad class of people on a neutral basis and these funds
flowed to religious schools only as a result of the private choices of aid recipients. Id. at 8-10.
Both state programs discussed in Mueller and Witters did not advance religion and were not
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. Id. The Zobrest Court decided that the same
reasoning that applied to Mueller and Witters applied to the present case as well. Id. at 10. The
Court determined that the service sought in this case was part of a government program that
distributes aid neutrally to any disabled child underthe IDEA, without regard to the nature ofthe
child's school. Id. at 10-11. According to Mueller and Witters, when the government offers aid
or a service on a neutral basis as part of a general program, the fact that it reaches a religious
school does not mean that the program is "skewed towards religion." Id at 10 (quoting Witters
v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,488 (1986)).
The Zobrest Court also found that this case is not analogous to the situations in Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985), in which the Court struck down statutes that provided religious schools with teaching
equipment and materials and personnel to teach on private school premises, respectively. Id.
at 11. The Zobrest Court first reasoned that the Meek and Grand Rapids programs were
different because they relieved the schools of costs that they otherwise would have borne and
constituted "direct and substantial advancement of religious activity" and subsidized the func-
tions of the religious schools. Id at 12 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,366 (1975)).
The Court then distinguished Meek and Grand Rapids by reasoning that the role of a sign-
language interpreter is different than that of a teacher. Id. at 13. The Court determined that a
sign-language interpreter would do nothing more than interpret any material presented to the
class and would "neither add to nor subtract from" the pervasively sectarian environment chosen
for the student by his parents. Id. Consequently, the Zobrest Court held that the Establishment
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D. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
In Zobrest, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
school district must provide a deaf student with an interpreter pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) if that student chooses to
attend a religious school.'29 The Court noted that such a service is part of a
general government program that gives aid to any child who qualifies as
"disabled" under the IDEA.13° The Court ultimately held that the Establish-
ment Clause did not prevent the school district from providing interpreters
because the IDEA created a neutral government program that provided aid to
students with disabilities, notto schools.' In Zobrest, however, the Court did
not apply the Lemon test to the question of the constitutionality of this particu-
lar type of aid to religious schools, but instead relied on the underlying
reasoning of prior cases.'32
First, the Court asserted that it had never barred religious institutions
from participating in social welfare programs or from receiving general
government benefits such as those granted under the IDEA.' The Establish-
ment Clause allows government programs to provide benefits on a neutral
basis to broad groups of people and to religious institutions without consider-
ation of religion.'34 Discussing Mueller and Witters, the Court pointed out
that both cases relied on two factors: neutrality and private choice.' s Both
cases also demonstrated that aid allocated on a neutral basis did not create
an incentive for students to pursue a religious education. 36 The same reason-
ing applied to the IDEA because, under that program, the government distrib-
uted aid on a neutral basis to a group of people classified as handicapped
without regard to their religious preferences. 37 Furthermore, such aid would
reach a sectarian school only as a result of the private choice of a student or
Clause does not prevent a school district from supplying a sign-language interpreterto a student
at a sectarian school who is receiving such aid. Id at 13-14.
129. Idat3.
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id at 13-14.
132. See id. at 8-13 (discussing Court's reasoning in earlier cases of Mueller, Witters,
Meek, and Grand Rapids, and applying this reasoning to Court's analysis of whether school
district should provide deaf student with interpreter at sectarian school). The Court does not
mention the Lemon test, which the Court typically applies to such cases involving aid to
religious schools, except to state that the court of appeals did apply the three-part test created
in Lemon. See id at 5.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id
135. Id at 8-10.
136. Id
137. Id at 10-11.
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parent.' The Court concluded that the IDEA did not create a financial
incentive for families to choose a religious school and that the presence of a
government-provided interpreter did not violate the Establishment Clause.'39
Second, the Court decided that the IDEA program was not analogous to
direct aid in the form of educational materials, equipment, and teaching
personnel. 40 The Court determined that the interpreter provided in Zobrest
was not equivalent to direct aid because the interpreter had not effectively
subsidized religious schools.14' Aid such as government-provided educational
materials, equipment, and teachers relieved the religious schools of expenses
for which the school otherwise would have paid.142 In Zobrest, the student,
not the school, would have paid for the interpreter, and therefore government
support would not amount to a direct subsidy because there would be no relief
to the religious school of a necessary cost.
43
The Court's reasoning in Zobrest emphasized the importance that
Mueller and Witters placed on neutrality and private choice in the allocation
of funds under government programs providing aid to religious schools.' 44 As
in Witters, the Zobrest Court upheld a program that provided aid on a neutral
basis to a student with a specific need. 45 Through Maine's interdistrict choice
program, school districts also allocate funds on a neutral basis - the specific
need of students who do not have access to a local school.146 Although both
138. Id at 10.
139. Id.atlO-11.
140. Id. at 11-13 (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); School Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 368-89 (1985)).
141. Id. at 12.
142. Id at 11-12.
143. Id at 12.
144. See supra notes 80-128 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Mueller and Witters and applying these cases to argument regarding inclusion of religious
schools in necessary interdistrict choice program in Maine). Because Parts ILB and II.C analyze
the Court's reasoning in Mueller and Witters and apply these cases to the constitutionality of
including religious schools in Maine's interdistrict choice program, there is no need to present
an analysis and application of the principles of neutrality and private choice once again in
discussing Zobrest in Part II.D.
145. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (describing government program as distributing benefits
"neutrally" to any disabled child without consideration ofnature ofschool); Witters v. Washing-
ton Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986) (describing statute in question as
providing aid to all persons with visual handicaps for education and vocational training); see
also Green, supra note 14, at 66 (stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Zobrest "that the
petitioner had qualified for the assistance for reasons completely unrelated to his attendance at
any particular school" and that, as in Witters, "the triggering of the benefit" bore no relation to
selection of school).
146. See ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (West 1993) (stating that students who
live in school district "which neither maintains a secondary school nor contracts for secondary
school privileges" may attend another school).
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Witters and Zobrest addressed neutrally-based aid programs, Zobrest specifi-
cally involved a secondary school student, not a college student, thus eliminat-
ing any concern that the age distinction might have provided a dividing line
between acceptable and unacceptable aid. 47 The reasoning of Zobrest further
provides support for arguments favoring the inclusion of religious schools in
Maine's interdistrict school choice program by the very absence of certain
factors that aided the Court's decision in Witters.
Unlike the Witters decision, Zobrest failed to note a distinction between
benefits paid directly to religious schools and aid given to students. 4 The
government-provided interpreter at issue in Zobrest constituted direct aid in
that the school district paid for and supplied the interpreter to the student at
the religious school.'49 Arguably, after Zobrest, the fact that the necessary
interdistrict choice program in Maine involves the payment of government
funds directly to the school ofthe student's choice is no longer of fundamental
importance.15 ° Instead, the Zobrest decision focused on the question of
whether the aid had the effect of a direct subsidy or provided an individual
benefit.'15  The question became whether the program served to relieve a
religious school of a cost the school would have otherwise incurred, or if the
student reaped the benefit of the aid.
5 2
Under the Zobrest analysis, the inclusion of religious schools in Maine's
necessary interdistrict choice program would not affect the neutrality of the
program, despite the school district's direct payment oftuition to the sectarian
school. Just as the petitioner in Zobrest would have had to pay for the inter-
preter if the Court had not decided in his favor, the families in Maine have had
147. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (stating that petitioner requested interpreter to accompany
him to high school classes); Witters, 474 U.S. at 483 (stating that petitioner was college
student); Bright, supra note 14, at 215 (stating "Zobrest presented the issue of whether the
distinction that Witters involved aid to a university instead of a [sic] elementary or secondary
school outweighed the importance of the private individual choice in directing aid to the
religious institution; it does not").
148. SeeZobrest, 509U.S. at9-11 (applying Witters Court's reasoning to present situation
and failing to discuss distinction between aid to students and direct payments to religious
schools mentioned by Witters Court); Witters, 474 U.S. at488 (stating that Washington program
distributes aid directly to student and therefore decision to pursue religious education must be
independent).
149. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4 (stating that petitioners asked school district to provide
interpreter to deaf student at Catholic school).
150. See Garnett, supra note I (stating that in Maine's interdistrict school choice program
town pays tuition to school that parents choose).
151. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12-13 (discussing differences between providing direct
grants of government aid to religious schools and dispensing aid to individual children with
disabilities).
152. See id. at 12 (distinguishing Meek and Grand Rapids as cases that involve aid that
relieves religious schools of necessary cost, thus amounting to subsidy, and stating that inter-
preter provided under IDEA does not relieve religious school of necessary cost).
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to pay for the education of their children at religiobs secondary schools. 53
The extension of Maine's interdistrict choice program to include religious
schools would not relieve those schools of an otherwise necessary expense,
as the students' parents, not the schools, would have to continue funding the
children's education.
Finally, the Zobrest Court fails to mention another important distinction
in Witters. The Washington program passed constitutional muster partially
because it did not result in a significant amount of aid flowing to religious
institutions." Instead, the government gave only a small fraction of the total
aid it distributed to a religious group or institution.I The inclusion of reli-
gious schools in Maine's interdistrict choice program, currently would affect
relatively few families. Even if school districts did begin to pay a more
substantial amount of tuition to religious schools, the program would still be
constitutional under Zobrest1
5 6
E. Agostini v. Felton
Four years after the Supreme Court decided, without applying the Lemon
test, that under a neutral aid program the government must provide an inter-
preter to a deaf student who had chosen to attend a religious school,'57 the
Court built on the reasoning of both Witters and Zobrest to alter substantially
the application oftheLemon test. InAgostiniv. Felton, the Court overturned
two prior decisions, returned to the Lemon test, and then altered the applica-
tion of the test to the question of whether a government program can aid
153. See id. (stating that religious high school "is not relieved of an expense that it other-
wise would have assumed in educating its students"); Gamett, supra note 1 (noting that parents
who send children to Catholic high school must pay students' tuition).
154. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)
(stating that"importantly, nothing in the record indicates that, ifpetitioner succeeds, any signifi-
cant portion of the aid expended under the Washington program as a whole will end up flowing
to religious education"); Bright, supra note 14, at 216 (stating that "after Zobrest, the Court
allows aid to flow to religious education regardless of... the substantiality of aid to the
school").
155. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 485-86 (discussing state aid program and asserting that "no
more than a minuscule amount of the aid awarded under the program is likely to flow to
religious education").
156. Seesupranotes 121-22 and accompanying text(noting Witters Court's discussion that
Washington program does not result in significant portion of aid flowing to religious institutions
and suggesting that inclusion of religious schools in Maine's interdistrict choice program would
likewise not result in large portion of aid flowing to religious institutions).
157. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1993) (discussing
relevant case law in determining constitutionality of government program providing interpreter
to deaf student but not including analysis of Lemon test); see also supra notes 129-43 and
accompanying text (discussing Court's decisions in Zobrest).
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religious institutions."5 8 The Court in Agostini also determined that Witters
and Zobrest had changed Establishment Clause jurisprudence." 9 Agostini
contributes to the trend in Establishment Clause case law that supports the
inclusion of religious schools in the necessary interdistrict choice program
implemented in Maine.
In this controversial opinion, the Supreme Court revisited a question of
aid to religious schools that it had previously decided in 1985.160 At issue was
the prior ruling inAguilar v. Felton,6' in which the Court held that the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibited New York City from sending public school
teachers into religious schools to provide remedial instruction for disadvan-
taged students pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965.162 In deciding whether they should grant to New York City
158. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2008-10(1997) (discussing Court's applica-
tion of Lemon test in Grand Rapids and Aguilar and stating that Court has not changed these
general principles but Court has undermined earlier assumptions and has changed its under-
standing of criteria used).
159. See id. at 2010 (stating that "[o]ur more recent cases have undermined the assump-
tions" that Court relied upon in applying Lemon testto earlier cases). The Court then proceeded
to discuss Zobrest and Witters in depth and demonstrated how these decisions had modified the
presumptions on which it had previously relied in decidingAguilar v. Felton and SchoolDistrict
of Grand Rapids v. Ball. Id. at 2010-14.
160. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003-05 (discussing facts ofAguilar v. Felton, questions
presented by that case in 1985, and Court's 1985 decision).
161. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
162. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408 & n.7 (1985) (affirming court of appeals's
decision that New York City's program providing federally supported instructional services to
disadvantaged children on premises of parochial schools violates Establishment Clause and is
unconstitutional). InAguilar, the Court considered the constitutionality of instructional services
provided to disadvantaged parochial school students by New York City and funded by Title I.
Id. at406. Public schoolteachers conducted this instruction on the premises ofparochial schools
while field supervisors closely supervised them to ensure that the teachers avoided any involve-
ment with religious activities within the parochial schools and did not use religious materials.
Id. at 406-07. The Aguilar Court found that New York City's Title I program was similar in
nature and operation to the programs that the Court struck down earlier that day in School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball. Id. at 408-09. The appellant had argued that the Court could
not distinguish Aguilar from Grand Rapids because New York City's program had adopted a
monitoring system to review the content of Title I classes. lId at 409. However, the Court found
that the monitoring system caused the government to become closely entangled with religion.
Id. at 409-10. The Aguilar Court looked to the third part of the Lemon test, in which the Court
had held that supervision necessary to ensure that teachers did not incorporate religion into their
teaching constituted excessive entanglement of church and state. Iad at 410. As in Lemon, New
York City's program involved aid in a "pervasively sectarian environment" and required
"ongoing inspection.., to ensure the absence of a religious message." Id. at 412. The program
also necessitated frequent contacts between public school and parochial school employees. Id.
at 414. Consequently, the Court determined that New York City's program necessitated
excessive entanglement, failed the Lemon test, and was thus "constitutionally flawed." Id.
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injunctive relief from this prohibition under Rule 60(b)(5),6 ' the Court
recognized that it is appropriate to grant such relief when significant changes
have occurred in either the relevant statutory or decisional law.16 The Court
then reviewed the rationale upon which Aguilar and its companion case,
School District of GrandRapids v. Ball,16' had relied and considered whether
there had been a significant change in decisional law.166 In each case, the
Court applied the Lemon test and determined that the programs considered
failed the test, thereby violating the Establishment Clause. 16' The Court
asserted that the Shared Time program implemented in GrandRapids had the
impermissible effect of promoting religion because the public school teachers
who instructed remedial secular courses on parochial school grounds could
indoctrinate religion in their work.168 Additionally, the mere presence of these
teachers created a "symbolic union" of church and state.169 The Shared Time
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). This subsection states: "On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may relieve a party... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding...
[when] it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Id.
164. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006.
165. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
166. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985) (holding that
programs in which public schools financed classes for nonpublic students, taught by public
school teachers, and conducted in the nonpublic schools violate the Establishment Clause). In
Grand Rapids, the Court considered two programs that used public funds to provide remedial
and enrichment classes to nonpublic school students in classrooms leased from and located in
nonpublic schools and taught by public school employees. Id. at 375-77. The Court noted that
40 of the 41 nonpublic schools which held the programs were sectarian and that only nonpublic
school students attended the programs. Id. at 378-79. The GrandRapids Court recognized that
the Establishment Clause is more than just a guarantee against a state-sponsored religion; it also
functions to guard the right of individuals to worship and requires the government to remain
neutral in regards to religion. Id. at 382. In applying the Lemon test, the Court noted that while
the test serves as only a guideline, the Court should measure state action alleged to violate the
Establishment Clause according to the Lemon criteria. Id. at 383. The Court found that the
programs were primarily secular. Id. However, the programs had the potential of impermissibly
advancing religion in three ways. Id. at 385. First, the teachers, many of whom taught or had
taught in the religious schools, may have inculcated religious beliefs in their teaching, resulting
in state-sponsored religious instruction. Id. at385-88. Second, the programs may have created
a symbolic link between government and religion, thus presenting an image of state endorse-
ment of religion, especially in the minds of children. Id. at 389-92. Finally, the programs may
have had the effect of promoting religion because they directly subsidize sectarian institutions,
just as a cash subsidy would, by taking over a portion of the responsibility for teaching certain
subjects. Id. at 392-97. Consequently, the Court held that the programs the School District of
the City of Grand Rapids implemented did not pass the "primary or principal effect" prong of
the Lemon test because they had the primary effect of advancing religion and therefore violated
the Establishment Clause and were unconstitutional. Id. at 397-98.
167. Agostini, 117S. Ct. at2008-10.
168. Id. at 2008-09.
169. Id. at 2009.
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program also effectively subsidized the sectarian schools' religious mission
by relieving schools of necessary expenses.17' These factors were also present
in New York City's Title I program that Aguilar examined.' Aguilar in-
volved the additional aspect of a monitoring system that sought to ensure the
secular content of Title I instruction, which the Court found to create an
excessive entanglement between government and religion. 72
Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion for the Court inAgostini, assessed
the reasoning of GrandRapids and Aguilar in light of the Court's more recent
decisions in Witters and Zobrest' 3 The Court determined thatthese cases had
undermined the assumptions that it relied upon in Grand Rapids and
Aguilar.74 The Agostini Court did note a change in the first prong of the
Lemon test -the assessment of the government's purpose in implementing a
program that aids religious schools.'75 However, the Court decided that prior
cases had altered the criteria used to determine whether a program has the
primary effect of advancing religion and thus violates Lemon's second
prong. 76 The Zobrest Court had refused to presume that the state-provided
interpreter, who also had an opportunity to inculcate religion through the act
of translating, would do so simply because he or she was in a sectarian set-
ting.' Therefore, the Agostini Court determined that it could no longer
assume that any public employee would inculcate religion in his or her work;
nor could it assume that the mere presence of a public employee on sectarian
school grounds necessarily created a symbolic link between church and
state.178
Furthermore, a review of Witters and Zobrest demonstrated that the Court
had abandoned its rule that all government programs that directly aid the
function of religious schools are invalid.'79 Although the aid recipients in
each case clearly would use state aid at religious schools, they did so only as
a result of private choice. 80 In following Witters and Zobrest, the Agostini
Court determined that it should not deem programs, such as New York City's









178. Id. at 2010-12.
179. Id. at2011-12.
180. Id
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because religious schools benefit from government aid as a result of the
program.' The Court recognized that Title I aid, like aid to a student who is
visually impaired or an interpreter for a deaf student, was also only available
to eligible recipients.' The Court noted a difference between the aid pro-
vided to one student with a disability and the Title I services that the govern-
ment provides to several students at once. It did not find a meaningful distinc-
tion, however, particularly because Zobrest did not turn on the fact that the
petitioner was, at the time of the lawsuit, the only student using a state-pro-
vided interpreter at a religious school.' The Agostini Court also did not find
it important that the school district provided Title I services directly to the
students without a formal, individualized application process.'
Just as the Court no longer presumes that New York City's Title I pro-
gram has the primary effect of advancing religion simply because it provides
direct aid to religious schools, a court should not presume that the inclusion
of religious schools in Maine's interdistrict choice program would advance
religion. As with Title I instruction and aid to disadvantaged students,
Maine's interdistrict choice program provides aid only to eligible students -
those without access to a public secondary school." 5 Also, theAgostini Court
continued to emphasize an important point set forth in Zobrest: The number
of students that benefit from a particular program is not important in determin-
ing whether that program advances religion. 6 Although school choice
advocates anticipate that only a small number of families would benefit from
the inclusion of religious schools in Maine's interdistrict choice program,'
such a fact is insignificant under the Court's reasoning in Agostini.
The Agostini Court also stressed the neutrality of the Title I program at
issue in Aguilar and referred back to the neutrality of the programs the Court
had upheld in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest.'8 The majority asserted that a
government program does not provide a student with an incentive to pursue
a religious education when the government allocates aid on a neutral, secular
basis that does not consider or favor religion and the government makes the
181. Id. at2012-13.
182. Id at2012.
183. Id. at 2013.
184. Id.
185. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (West 1993) (stating that secondary
students who reside in school district that neither maintains nor contracts forprivileges at public
school may attend another school and district will pay tuition).
186. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2013.
187. See Young, supra note 2 (stating that including religious schools in Maine's inter-
district choice program would apply to 140 towns and about 100 families).
188. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014.
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aid available to religious and nonreligious beneficiaries alike.189 The Court
had not considered this factor when it struck down the programs in Grand
Rapids and Aguilar, but the Agostini opinion makes it clear that New York
City's Title I program allocated services on the basis of neutral criteria
provided by statute and therefore the Court should not have struck down New
York's program in 1985.1' Maine's necessary interdistrict choice program
also allocates aid on the basis of eligibility under neutral statutory criteria,
and, therefore, the inclusion of religious schools would not provide an incen-
tive for a student to select a religious school over a public or secular private
school. 191
In addressing the third prong of the Lemon test, the Court's opinion in
Agostini concluded that the factors used to assess whether a government
program necessitated excessive entanglement were the same as the factors
used to examine the effect of the program." The Court determined that the
factors used in assessing both entanglement and effect have been as follows:
(1) the character of the institution that receives aid, (2) the nature of that aid,
and (3) the relationship between the recipient of the aid and the government.193
Thus, it reasoned, the entanglement prong of the Lemon test should be treated
as simply an aspect of the effects prong. 94 In reviewing the Aguilar Court's
determination that New York City's Title I program caused excessive entan-
glement, the Agostini Court concluded that the assumptions which the Court
made about the nature of the program had required the monitoring of the
program. 9s These assumptions, the Court stated, were the same ones that Wit-
ters, Zobrest, and other Establishment Clause cases had rendered invalid. 96
This led the Court to conclude that the program did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion. 197 It then reasoned that if it does not presume
that a program does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the
Court alsowill not presume that the program requires government monitoring
and that excessive entanglement follows from that monitoring.
98
189. Id
190. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 6315(b) (1994) (setting forth neutral criteria for eligibility for
Title I instruction).
191. See Mn. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (West 1993) (setting forth neutral criteria
for eligibility for tuition grant to another school).
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The Agostini Court's blend of the excessive entanglement prong into
the primary effects prong of the Lemon test'" is important to the constitu-
tionality of the inclusion of religious schools in Maine's necessary inter-
district choice program in two ways. First, the Agostini decision makes it
clear that the entanglement prong disappears because the Court no longer
presumed that government programs that provide aid to religious schools
have the primary effect of advancing religion."° Therefore, the Court will
never require pervasive monitoring, which was seemingly the only type of
entanglement the Court found to be excessive." 1 Likewise, a court cannot
presume that the interdistrict choice program in Maine has the primary effect
of advancing religion because it allocates tuition on a neutral basis, according
to statutory eligibility, does not serve to provide an incentive to attend a
religious school, and benefits the students involved rather than the religious
schools.
Second, the elimination of Lemon's third prong as a separate test suggests
a conclusion that interaction, or entanglement, between the government and
the religious schools involved in a program is not of primary significance and
has not been for some time. Prior to Agostini, the Court had failed to address
the entanglement issue in both Witters and Zobrest. °2 These three cases allow
one to conclude that a court can find that a government program which aids
religious schools is constitutional as long as it has a secular purpose and does
not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Once the state legislature
includes religious schools in Maine's necessary interdistrict choice program,
some interaction between those religious schools receiving tuition payments
and the school districts providing such payments will occur.03 According to
199. See id. at 2015 (stating that Court has addressed same factors in assessing both effects
prong and entanglement prong and therefore "it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is
significant and treat it ... as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect!).
200. See id at 2015-16 (asserting thatAguilar Court's finding thatNew York City's Title
I program resulted in excessive entanglement rested on now invalid presumption that program
had primary effect of advancing religion).
201. See ida at 2015 (discussing entanglements, or interactions between church and state,
that are not excessive and that Court traditionally has found to be tolerable such as government
review, periodic visits to program, and annual audits).
202. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1993) (discussing
Court's reasoning in earlier cases and applying reasoning to question of whether school district
should provide deaf student with interpreter at sectarian school, instead of applying any of three
prongs ofLemon test); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489
n.5 (1986) (declining to address entanglement prong of Lemon test).
203. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (West 1993) (stating that school district
in which students' parents reside pays tuition). The school district paying the tuition will
inevitably have some contact with the school receiving the tuition because the district pays the
school directly. Id
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the Court's reasoning in Zobrest, Witters, andAgostini, however, this interac-
tion is neither consequential nor dispositive.'
F. Summary of Case Law as Applied to
Maine's Necessary Interdistrict Choice Program
The inclusion of religious schools in a necessary interdistrict choice
program such as the one that Maine implemented is constitutionally permissi-
ble following the Supreme Court's decisions in Mueller, Witters, and Zo-
brest.°5 Although the Court has altered the Lemon test over the years, it con-
tinues to apply aspects of that test to some Establishment Clause inquiries.2"
Maine's necessary interdistrict choice program can provide aid to religious
schools because it would continue to satisfy certain criteria outlined in the
Court's recent opinions.
The program clearly serves a secular purpose by ensuring that the chil-
dren of Maine receive a secondary education." 7 Maine's interdistrict choice
program is neutral because the school district in which the parents reside pays
all eligible students' tuition regardless of their choice of school." 8 The
addition of religious schools to the Maine statute would not affect this neutral-
ity. A student is eligible for aid when he or she has a specific need,2' in this
204. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015-16 (stating that Court has "always tolerated some
level of involvement" between church and state); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8-14 (discussing Court's
reasoning in earlier cases and holding that Establishment Clause does not prevent school district
from providing deaf student with interpreter at sectarian school but failing to address possible
resulting interaction between government and religious school); Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 & n.5
(declining to address entanglement prong ofLemon test butnevertheless determining that exten-
sion of aid used at religious school does not violate Establishment Clause).
205. See supra notes 80-156 and accompanying text (analyzing Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest and concluding that each case permits inclusion of religious schools in Maine's inter-
district choice program).
206. Compare Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8-14 (discussing Court's reasoning in earlier cases for
purposes of assessing constitutionality of government program but failing to discuss applicabil-
ity of Lemon test) with Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2010-16 (1997) (discussing effects
prong of Lemon test and entanglement prong as "an aspect of the inquiry into" effects prong of
Lemon test).
207. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (stating that Minnesota statute
clearly served secular purpose in ensuring that children of Minnesota are well-educated).
208. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (stating generally that secondary students
without access to public school may attend nearby public school, approved private school, or
school in another state or country and that district in which students' parents reside will pay
tuition). No language in the statute indicates that the district's payment of tuition is in any way
dependent on the family's choice of school. Id
209. See Zobrestv. CatalinaFoothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10(1993) (stating thatunder
IDEA, government allocated aid on neutral basis to group of people classified as disabled);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,483 (1986) (stating that aid
is available under Washington program to all those classified as visually impaired).
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instance, when the student resides in a school district that does not maintain
a secondary school. The program's neutrality does not provide an incentive
for a parent to choose to send his or her child to a religious school. Thus, the
program does not advance religion.21 Of primary importance is that any
government aid that would reach a religious school would do so only as a
result of the private and independent choices of parents and families, which
demonstrates that the state does not intend to promote religion through the
interdistrict choice program.2 ' The inclusion of religious schools in Maine's
interdistrict choice program would not serve to relieve those schools of an
otherwise necessary cost because the students' parents would otherwise pay
the students' tuition. Instead, the individual students would reap the benefits
of a revised interdistrict choice program.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Agostini reinforces the fulfill-
ment of these criteria as essential for a government program that results in the
provision of aid to religious institutions to survive constitutional scrutiny.212
The Agostini Court concluded that it cannot presume that all government
programs which directly aid religious schools are invalid.21 3 In fact, if a
program is neutral and aid reaches religious schools only as a result of private
choice, as Maine's interdistrict choice program does, no presumption exists
that the program has the primary effect of advancing religion simply because
it incidentally aids religious schools.214 AfterAgostini, this is the end of the
inquiry because the Court has deemed the entanglement prong unimportant
and subsumed by the effects prong.
215
Not only does the inclusion of religious schools in Maine's necessary
interdistrict choice program pass constitutional muster, but Establishment
Clause jurisprudence requires the program to include religious institutions.
This is apparent under the child benefit theory that the Supreme Court adopted
210. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (stating that neutral statute creates "no financial incentive
for students to undertake sectarian education"); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (stating that facially
neutral statute applied to all families regardless of school preference).
211. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89 (stating that one aspect of Washington's program
central to Establishment Clause inquiry is that aid only flows to religious institutions as result
ofprivate and independent choice); Mueller, 463 U.S. at399 (discussing importance ofparents'
role in distributing aid to schools).
212. Seesupranotes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussingAgostini's reliance on and
reinforcement of Witters and Zobrest).
213. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2011(1997).
214. Seesupranotes 168-69,174-79 and accompanying text (discussing concepts ofprivate
choice and neutrality and how they undermine presumption that programs that aid religion have
primary effect of advancing religion in AgostinO.
215. Seesupra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (discussing blending of entanglement
prong of Lemon test into effects prong).
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in Witters, Zobrest, and other recent case law.216 This theory emphasizes that
the government provides aid to schools not for the benefit of the school, but
for the benefit of the individual.217 The child benefit theory applies best to
government aid that is need-based and therefore the Court's use of the theory
in deciding Witters and Zobrest was appropriate.218 Both cases emphasized
the neutrality of the service that the government provided to a class of citizens
based upon a particular need.219 In each case, one member of the eligible class
of citizens whom the government excluded from the aid program brought the
lawsuit because of the individual's private and independent choice to use that
aid to attend a religious institution." The question these eases asked, there-
fore, was not whether the Establishment Clause permitted the program to
extend aid to that person, but whether the Establishment Clause required the
program to do so. The answer in both Witters and Zobrest was a resounding
yes?2 1 A government program that provides aid to a class of persons based
upon need must not exclude an eligible person from that program simply
because the aid will reach a religious institution as the result of a private and
independent choice.'
Professor Joseph P. Viteritti has noted that Witters and Zobrest advance
religious tolerance because the Court refuses to apply the Establishment
Clause in such a way that will disadvantage individuals because of their
216. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 116 (identifying child benefit theory as "adopted by
the Supreme Court in several major cases"). Viteritti identifies these cases as including, among
others, Witters and Zobrest. Id. at 116 n.7.
217. Id at 128-30 (discussing assertion that schoolchildren and state, not schools, are
beneficiaries of aid).
218. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (describing
government program at issue as distributing benefits "to any child qualifying as disabled under
the IDEA"); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986)
(stating that petitioner suffered from progressive eye condition and therefore "was eligible for
vocational rehabilitation assistance" under Washington statute).
219. See supra notes 116-18,144-47 andaccompanyingtext(discussingneutrality ofneed-
based programs in Witters and Zobrest).
220. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (stating that petitioner asked school district to provide
interpreter for use at religious school and that school district denied request); Witters, 474 U.S.
at 483 (stating that petitioner had applied for vocational aid to use at bible college and Commis-
sion denied aid).
221. See Zobrest, 509U.S. at 13-14 (holdingthatunderEstablishmentClause, deafstudent
is entitled to interpreter provided by school district); Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 (determining that
extension of aid under state's vocational rehabilitation program to qualified student at religious
school is not inconsistent with Establishment Clause).
222. See supra notes 110-13, 129-32 and accompanying text (discussing neutral pro-
grams based upon need and element of private choice in programs that aid religious institu-
tions).
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religious affiliation or will deny them ofnecessary entitlements.' Regardless
of whether the Court advances religious tolerance, the Court in both Witters
andZobrest emphasized the neutrality of the need-based government programs
over the directness of the aid involved. The Court also determined that the
government cannot deny an eligible person his aid because of a private choice
that the recipient makes. 4 Therefore, it follows that when an interdistrict
school choice program is need-based, it must also include religious schools.
Also, the government cannot refuse to pay the tuition of an eligible student
who independently chooses to use his or her aid at a religious school.'
Arguably, the Court's decision in Agostini supports this proposition as
well. The aid granted under Title I is also need-based in that, to be eligible,
a student must reside in a low-income area and he or she must be failing or at
risk of failing his or her classes. 6 The government does not grant the aid on
an individual basis, but rather it grants the aid to students as a group. 7 The
Court inAgostini followed its previous decisions in that it refused to interpret
the Establishment Clause in such a way as to prevent eligible students who
independently chose to attend a religious school from receiving remedial
instruction.
Thus, underthe Court's recent Establishment Clause decisions, including
Agostini, the state government must include religious schools in Maine's
need-based interdistrict choice program. Such is not the case, however, for
school voucher programs. States do not implement these programs out of
necessity, and scholars have been debating the merits of these programs since
223. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 138 (asserting that Rehnquist Court has interpreted
Establishment Clause not to deny aid to some that is made available to others as matter of public
policy). Viteritti states:
The hallmark of the Rehnquist Court, however, has been to advance religious
tolerance based on the precept that the Establishment Clause not be misapplied to
encumber or disadvantage individuals or groups because of their religious orienta-
tion. This Court strives to assure that religious affiliation will not serve to deny
entitlements to some that are made available to all as a matter of general public
policy.
Id
224. See supra notes 113-15, 123-27, 144-52 and accompanying text (discussing impor-
tance of neutrality and lesser importance of directness of aid in programs that aid religious
institutions).
225. See supra notes 110-20, 153-56 and accompanying text (discussing conclusions of
Witters and Zobrest and application of each case to other need-based government programs,
such as Maine's interdistrict choice program, in which aid reaches religious schools as result
of private choice).
226. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003-04 (1997).
227. See id. at 2004-05 (discussing implementation of Title I services and stating that
teachers provide services to classrooms of students).
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before the Supreme Court's decision inAgostini.'s2 Therefore, these programs
require a separate analysis of the constitutional arguments and the effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in Agostini.
III School Voucher Programs and the Inclusion of Religious Schools
Recently, two school voucher programs that include sectarian schools
have been the subjects of litigation inthe state courts of Ohio and Wisconsin.
In Cleveland, Ohio, the city enacted the "Pilot Program" in response to an acute
educational problem in the Cleveland City School District." The Pilot Pro-
gram includes a scholarship program that enables low-income students, chosen
by lottery, to attend "alternative schools" registered with the state." The
alternative schools for the 1996-97 school year included fifty-three private
schools, approximately eighty percent of which were sectarian. 2 When a
scholarship recipient chooses to use his or her scholarship at any private
school, the state gives the chosen private school a check made payable to the
student's parents. 3 The parents then endorse the check over to the school. 4
In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, as
amended in 1995," provides state funds to 15% of the student population of
the Milwaukee Public School system to enable those students to attend both
sectarian and nonsectarian private schools?16 Previously, the program al-
lowed only 1.5% of the student population to participate and limited the
choice of schools to only nonsectarian private schools?" In addition to
extending the program to sectarian schools, the 1995 amendments also ex-
panded the number of students eligible to participate and the number of
schools that could accept students in the program? 8 Unchanged, however, is
228. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing school voucher debate
before Supreme Court decided Agostini).
229. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583, at *1-*2 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 1, 1997) (describing school voucher, or "scholarship," program that Cleveland
implemented), appeal allowed, 684 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1997); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d
602, 608-09 (Wis. 1998) (describing school voucher program that Milwaukee implemented),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
230. Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at*1.
231. Id.
232. Id. at *2.
233. Id. at*1.
234. Id,
235. Jacksonv. Benson, 578N.W.2d 602,608-09 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 466
(1998).
236. Id. at 608.
237. Id. at 607.
238. Id. at 608-09.
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the limitation on eligibility based on the students' family's income level. 9
Only those students whose family's income does not exceed 1.75 the federal
poverty level are eligible for state funds.4 The state delivers the aid in the
form of a check to the private school.2" However, the student's parent or
guardian, to whom the check is made payable to, must restrictively endorse
the check to the school.242
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin struck down the amended Milwaukee
program in August 1997243 without taking into consideration the Supreme
Court's recent decision inAgostini v. Felton.2' In May of the same year, the
Court of Appeals of Ohio struck down the Cleveland program in Simmons-
Harris v. Goff245 The parties who sought to continue to include religious
239. Id at 608. The court, in listing the changes to the program as implemented through
the 1995 amendments, does not note a change in the requirement that the students' family's
income not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty level. Id. at 609-10.
240. Id. at 608.
241. Id. at 609.
242. Id.
243. See Jacksonv. Benson, 570N.W.2d 407, 415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (determining that
trial court reached correct result that Milwaukee program is inconsistent with Wisconsin and
U.S. Constitutions and thus cannot operate as it currently exists), rev'd, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
244. See id at421 (noting briefly thatAgostini was decided while parties were briefing this
appeal). In its majority opinion, the Court ofAppeals of Wisconsin only referenced theAgostini
decision once. Id. The court merely stated that it had been decided and pointed out that it had
not reinstated all of Michigan's education programs at issue when it overturned parts of School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball. Id. A discussion of the rationale ofdgostini or its interpreta-
tion of the Lemon test did not follow. See generally id. In his dissent, however, Judge
Roggensack did include a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion inAgostini. Id
at 431-34 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).
245. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96APE08-982, 1997 WL 217583, at *16 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 1, 1997) (reversing trial court and concluding that Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program
is unconstitutional), appeal allowed, 684 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1997). In Simmons-Harris, the
Court of Appeals of Ohio considered the Pilot Scholarship Program, which the Ohio state
legislature had enacted in Cleveland to give state funds to students from low-income families
to attend participating "alternative" schools, 80%ofwhich were sectarian in the 1996-97 school
year. Id. at * 1-*2. The court analyzed Cleveland's program under the three-part Lemon test
because the test has guided the Supreme Court since its inception. Id at *4. First, the court
determined that the program has a secular purpose because it seeks to provide low-income
families with varied educational opportunities. Id In determining whether the program has the
primary effect of advancing religion, the court looked to two factors: neutrality towards religion
and directness of the aid. Id The court concluded that the scholarship program was not neutral
because little opportunity existed for students to apply scholarship money toward a secular
education, the benefits of the scholarship program outweigh the benefits available under the
component tutorial program, and the program creates an incentive for parents to send their
children to religious schools. Id at *7-*9. In assessing the directness of the aid, the court found
that lack of public school participation in the program left parents with few choices; therefore,
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schools in the Milwaukee program appealed to the state supreme court, and
those in support of the inclusion of religious schools in the Cleveland voucher
program have requested to appeal the decision of the court of appeals.246
Although no further action has been noted regarding the appeal of the Court
of Appeals of Ohio decision, in June 1998 in Jackson v. Benson,2 7 the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin and found that the Milwaukee program does not violate either the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution or the state constitu-
tion.248 The Supreme Court's decision inAgostini, considered in conjunction
with other relevantEstablishment Clause cases, influenced the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin's decision and provided important rationale that enabled the
court to reverse the appellate court decision.2 9 This demonstrates that the
Supreme Court's decision in Agostini not only adds to the line of Establish-
ment Clause case law that allows the inclusion of religious schools in neces-
the parents' decisions had not been genuine or independent. l at *10. Also, the amount of
aid that flowed to sectarian schools through the program is substantial. Id Consequently, the
court determined that Cleveland's program has the primary effect ofadvancing religion and thus
violates the United States Constitution. Id. Additionally, the Cleveland program violates the
Ohio Constitution, as it provides at least as much protection against state funding of religious
institutions as the Establishment Clause. Id. at * 12.
246. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 684N.E.2d 705,705 (Ohio 1997) (allowing discretion-
ary appeals); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,607 (Wis. 1998) (appeal of Court ofAppeals
of Wisconsin decision to strike down Milwaukee program as unconstitutional), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 466 (1998).
247. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
248. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998) (concluding that amended
Milwaukee program does not violate Establishment Clause or Wisconsin Constitution). In
Jackson, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the validity of the amended Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program, a voucher program for low-income families that includes religious
schools in its voucher recipients. Id. at 607-09. First, the court addressed whether the program
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. at 610-20. In doing so, the court analyzed all prongs of the Lemon test and all of the recent
Establishment Clause cases. Id. Second, the court addressed whether the program violates
the state constitution and its version of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 620-23. Third, the
court looked at whether the amended program is a private or local bill enacted in violation
of the procedural requirements of the Wisconsin Constitution. Id. at 623-27. Fourth, the
court considered whether the program violates the uniformity provision of the Wisconsin
Constitution. Id. at 627-28. Fifth, the court addressed the issue of whether Milwaukee's
program violates Wisconsin's public purpose doctrine. Id. at 628-30. Finally, the court
considered the equal protection claim the NAACP raised. Id. at 630-32. The court concluded
that the Milwaukee program did not violate any federal or state constitutional provisions or the
Wisconsin public purpose doctrine and it dismissed the NAACP's equal protection claim. Id.
at 632.
249. See id at 616-18 (discussing Agostini and its application to assessment of Milwau-
kee's voucher program).
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sary interdistrict choice programs, but it also lends support to the inclusion of
such schools in voucher programs.20
PriortoAgostini, scholars have considered the constitutionality ofschool
voucher programs that include religious schools and have analyzed the issue
in light of existing Establishment Clause jurisprudenceeY Such scholarship
has taken two positions. 2 Some scholars have proposed that the inclusion of
religious schools in voucher programs passes constitutional muster, 3 while
others have asserted that such programs are unconstitutional. 4
This Part summarizes the constitutional arguments made and the cases
that scholars have considered before the Supreme Court decided Agostini,
both for and against the inclusion of religious schools in school voucher
programs such as those that Cleveland and Milwaukee have implemented. It
then explains how Agostini applies differently in the school voucher context.
This Part concludes that the Agostini decision allows voucher programs to
include religious schools, but does not require such inclusion.
A. The Constitutional Arguments in Favor of the Inclusion of
Religious Schools in School Voucher Programs
Many scholars have argued that school voucher programs which provide
aid to both sectarian and nonsectarian private schools are constitutional under
the Establishment Clause." Such scholars have made five major points, most
250. See infra notes 333-57 and accompanying text (discussing application of Supreme
Court's decision in Agostini to school voucher programs).
251. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (noting that scholars discussed issue
of constitutionality of school voucher programs that include religious schools before Supreme
Court decided Agostini).
252. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' constitutional
arguments for inclusion of religious schools before Supreme Court's decision in Agostini);
supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing opponents' arguments against school
voucher programs that include sectarian schools).
253. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' constitutional
arguments for inclusion of religious schools before Supreme Court's decision in Agostini).
254. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing opponents' arguments
against school voucher programs that include sectarian schools).
255. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 9 (arguing that programs that "provide nondiscrimina-
tory aid to private sectarian and nonsectarian schools do not violate the Establishment Clause");
Choper, supra note 78, at 12 (asserting that constitutionality of voucher programs that include
religious schools "was apparently resolved in 1986" after Court's decision in Witters); Viteritti,
supra note 22, at 116 (arguing that "tuition assistance provided to parents who choose to send
their children to schools with religious affiliations" is constitutional); Bodemer, supra note 14,
at 280 (arguing that school voucher programs can withstand constitutional challenges);
Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1115 (asserting that Supreme Court would find voucher program
that included benefits to religious schools to be constitutional).
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of which center around particular Establishment Clause cases already dis-
cussed in Part II," but which are also important to advocates' arguments for
the inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs. This Part addresses
these arguments as well." 7 First, scholars have recognized that the Supreme
Court has used the Lemon test to strike down statutes that provided aid to
religion, but they have distinguished Nyquist, which did just that." ' Second,
many scholars have relied onMueller in support ofthe theory thatthe elements
of private choice and neutrality contribute to the constitutionality ofavoucher
program. 9 Third, commentators have pointed to Witters as providing direct
support for the inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs.2" Fourth,
scholars have asserted that under Zobrest, a court will not deny aid to an
individual based on his or her religious beliefs when that person is otherwise
eligible for the aid.261 Finally, these scholars have maintained that school
voucher programs that include religious schools can pass the Lemon test.262
First, scholars have recognized the Lemon test as a standard for assessing
statutes that may provide aid to religious schools.263 These scholars have
noted that in the years immediately following the Lemon test's creation, the
Supreme Court used it to strike down statutes that provided aid to religion,'6
256. See supra Parts II.A-D (analyzing Lemon, Nyquist, Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest and
applying these cases to necessary interdistrict choice programs).
257. See infra notes 263-96 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' analyses of
Lemon, Nyquist, Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest in light of constitutionality of school voucher
programs that include religious schools).
258. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 133-35 (discussing problems with Court's decision in
Nyquist); infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text (discussing school voucher advocates'
views of Nyquist).
259. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 41 (asserting that Mueller Court decided that aspect of
parental choice in statute reduced Establishment Clause objections); infra notes 271-76 and
accompanying text (discussing school voucher advocates' reliance on Mueller).
260. See Choper, supra note 78, at 12 (asserting that "[t]he constitutionality of vouchers
was apparently resolved in 1986" in the Witters decision); infranotes 277-85 and accompanying
text (discussing scholars' analyses of Witters in light of inclusion of religious schools in school
voucher programs).
261. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 138 (asserting that under Zobrest courts will not deny
entitlements); infra notes 286-91 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Zobrest on
scholars' arguments).
262. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 62 (concluding that programs that aid religious schools
can pass Lemon test); infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' assess-
ment of school voucher programs under Lemon test).
263. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 20-62 (analyzing Lemon test and Establishment Clause
opinions that deal with aid to religious schools); Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1081-92 (analyz-
ing Lemon test and recent Establishment Clause opinions).
264. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 23-28 (discussing cases such as Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
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such as the statute at issue in Nyquist.265 However, Nyquist involved three
programs that only provided aid to private schools and to parents whose
children were attending private schools.266 Advocates of the inclusion of
religious schools in school voucher programs have distinguished the statutes
in Nyquist from programs that are similar to voucher systems, such as pro-
grams in which the government provides aid to all parents or schools.
2 67
These advocates also have contended that state programs neutrally allocate
vouchers268 and have relied heavily on the Court's changes in its application
of the Lemon test in more recent opinions, which allow neutrally distributed
aid to reach religious schools.269 Voucher plan advocates also note the
Court's failure to rely on Lemon in other opinions involving the finding of
sectarian schools.
Second, scholars have cited the Supreme Court's decision in Mueller for
the proposition that a program that provides aid to religious schools only as
a result of parental choice is constitutional.2  In Mueller, the Court upheld
a statute that granted parents of all schoolchildren, regardless of the school the
parents chose, tax deductions for reasonable educational expensesY.2  Simi-
larly, school voucher programs also implement parental choice, and public
349 (1975), School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), which struck down statutes that provided aid to religious schools
and thus failed Lemon test); Viteritti, supra note 22, at 133-35 (discussing Nyquist and other
decisions from early 1970s that prevented aid to religious schools); Nasstrom, supra note 14,
at 1084-85 (analyzing Nyquist).
265. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,762-68
(1973) (discussing New York tax programs that provide aid to nonpublic schools and have
impermissible effect of advancing religion and are thus unconstitutional).
266. Id.
267. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 133-35 (discussing Court's opinion in Nyquist and
noting that "a problem in this case was that financial aid was made available only to private
schools"); Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1084-85 (describing programs that Supreme Court struck
down in Nyquist and asserting that "the statutes' benefits were available only to parents with
children attending private schools, whereas constitutionally-permissible statutes allowed all
parents to avail state benefits").
268. See Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1093 (noting that voucher programs available to all
parents at specified income level are neutral).
269. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 136 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's suggestion to relax
primary effect prong of Lemon test in Mueller); Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1087-88 (discussing
Court's change in analysis of Lemon's effects prong in Mueller and opinions that follow).
270. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 30 (noting that Supreme Court "curiously failed to rely
on Lemon" in Zobrest, which involved sectarian school funding).
271. See id. at 41 (asserting that in Mueller, Court decided that aspect of parental choice
in statute reduced Establishment Clause objections); Viteritti, supra note 22, at 136 (noting that
Court's decision in Mueller "reinforced the notion of parental choice").
272. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1983).
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funds only aid religious education as a result of parents' private choices.2"3
One commentator also has noted that the services in Mueller were available
to all parents, regardless of whether their children attended a sectarian or a
nonsectarian school, and thus were neutrally available.2' School voucher
programs are similarly neutral, in that they often make aid available to all
parents at a specific income level, but without regard to religious prefer-
ences.275 Professor Viteritti has asserted that the Mueller opinion also pro-
poses a relaxation of the Lemon test, thus reducing the obstacles confronting
school voucher programs.276
Third, some scholars have pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in
Witters as dispositive on the issue of whether or not the government can subsi-
dize a student's tuition atasectarian school.2' In Witters, the Court considered
whether the state must provide a visually impaired student with state aid to
attend a religious school.27 Professor Jesse H. Choper has pointed out that as
with a voucher program, the aid in Witters went to the student, notto the school,
and the institution benefitted only as a result of the private and independent
choice of the recipient.279 Also, the aid distributed in Witters was available for
expenditure in all schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian.2so Furthermore,
Professor Choperhas contendedthatthe concurring opinions in Witters support
the constitutionality ofvoucher programs.28' JusticePowell concurredwiththe
majority's opinion and specifically notedthatwhen state programs are entirely
neutral in offering aid to a class of persons without regard to religion, that aid
does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.282 Justices White and
273. See COOKSON, supra note 8, at 64 (discussing school voucher programs and noting
that they "allow families to enroll their children in a private or public school of their choice").
274. See Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1086 (noting that Mueller provided neutral aid
through tax deductions available to all parents).
275. See id. at 1093 (discussing voucher programs in which aid is neutral because it is
made available to all parents at specified income level).
276. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 136 (noting that Mueller opinion proposed relaxing of
"primary effects" prong of Lemon test). Professor Viteritti has stated that in Mueller, Justice
Rehnquistcalled theLemontest "no more than 'ahelpful signpostin dealingwith Establishment
Clause challenges."' Id. (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 393).
277. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 17 (contending that Witters sets forth proposition that
no constitutional violation occurs when government subsidizes tuition at religious school);
Choper, supra note 78, at 12 (asserting that "[tihe constitutionality of vouchers was apparently
resolved in 1986" in Witters decision).
278. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986).
279. See Choper, supra note 78, at 12 (discussing Court's rationale in Witters).
280. Id
281. Id at 13. Professor Choper stated that "[i]t is in concurring opinions... that the
voucher issue is resolved." Id.
282. Id
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O'Connor also wrote concurring opinions in which they agreed with Justice
Powell." 3 Professor Choper has argued that the concurrences of the three
Justices describe a situation that includes voucher plans.2 ' The Justices
emphasized the neutrality of the aid in that it went to all parents who
have children in any school, noted that if the aid went to religious schools it
would be the product of private choice, and decided that such aid is constitu-
tional.285
Fourth, scholars who advocate the inclusion of religious schools in
voucher programs also have asserted that Zobrest represents the Supreme
Court's departure from the Lemon test.286 In Zobrest, the Supreme Court did
not implement the Lemon test2 .7 in considering whether a school district must
provide a deaf student attending religious school with an interpreter pursuant
to the IDEA.288 The Court in Zobrest relied on the principle that the general
program distributed funds neutrally to any eligible child, without regard to the
religious affiliation of that child's school.2 9 Also, Professor Viteritti has
suggested that, under Zobrest, the Court will not deny aid to one person
because of his or her religious beliefs when that person is otherwise eligible
for the aid.29 Similarly, a court should not deny a voucher to a student who
chooses to attend a religious school when that student is otherwise eligible for
the voucher based on his or her family's income level.29'
Finally, even when courts apply the Lemon test, scholars have noted that




286. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 30 (noting that Supreme Court failed to apply Lemon
test in deciding Zobrest).
287. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1993) (analyzing
question of whether to grant interpreter to deaf student who has chosen to attend religious
school in light of'Mueller, Witters, Meek, and Grand Rapids). The Court did not mention the
Lemon test in its assessment of the question at hand. Id.
288. Id at 3.
289. See Bright, supra note 14, at 215 (asserting that Zobrest Court "explicitly relied on
the principle that the state funds sent to religious schools were part of a general program
distributing funds neutrally to any child without regard to any religious affiliation of the school
the student attends").
290. See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 138 (discussing impact of Zobrest, neutrality of aid,
and government refusal to deny entitlements).
291. See id. at 190-91 (concludingthatCourtwoulduphold school voucherplan involving
sectarian schools and, therefore, low-income students would have opportunity to receive quality
education and exercise religious freedom).
292. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 62 (concluding that "[v]irtually any result can be
achieved under the Court's elastic application" of Lemon test); Bodemer, supra note 14, at 291-
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First, voucher programs have the same valid secular purposes that other
constitutional programs funding religious education have had - aiding educa-
tion, creating competition between schools, and relieving financial burdens
of schools.293 Second, voucher programs do not have the primary effect
of advancing religion when the government provides aid on a neutral basis
and it flows to a religious school only as a result of private choice.29
Third, Professor Mark J. Beutler has noted that concern over entanglement
is not important in the context of such aid to religious schools because
any audit would impose a burden on only the school, not the govern-
ment.29" Also, another commentator has asserted that the omission of any
discussion of the entanglement prong in the Witters and Zobrest decisions
implies that an analysis of school voucher programs can avoid that prong of
the Lemon test.
21
In sum, scholars have asserted that voucher programs that provide aid to
students on a neutral basis can constitutionally include sectarian schools.
297
Advocates of the inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs have
demonstrated how past Supreme Court decisions support the constitutionality
of such voucher plans.29 These scholars, however, have yet to consider the
Supreme Court's decision in Agostini. Accordingly, Part III.C explains how
the Court's most recent decision regarding aid to religious schools impacts the
arguments presented here.29
300 (determining that school voucher programs pass all three prongs of Lemon test); Nasstrom,
supra note 14, at 1097 (asserting that Court would uphold as constitutional under Lemon test
school voucher programs that include religious schools).
293. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 30-31 (noting that Court has always found secular
purposes in programs that fund religious education).
294. See Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1092-95 (asserting that voucher programs are consti-
tutional when aid is neutrally provided and private choices direct aid to religious schools).
295. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 59 (asserting that "[i]n the context of parochial school
aid, the irrelevance of entanglement as an Establishment Clause concern is also apparent").
296. See Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1096 (suggesting that after Witters and Zobrest,
school vouchers are not subject to entanglement prong).
297. See Beutler, supra note 22, at 9 (asserting that school voucher programs that "provide
nondiscriminatory aid" do not violate Establishment Clause); Viteritti, supra note 22, at 192
(concluding that voucher programs allow religious freedom, provide educational opportunities
for lower-income families, "mak[e] such alternatives available to all," and do not violate First
Amendment).
298. See supra notes 263-96 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' assessment of
Lemon, Nyquist, Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest as they have argued that inclusion of religious
schools in voucher programs is constitutional).
299. See infra Part III.C (discussing impact of.Agostini on arguments both for and against
inclusion of religious schools in school voucher programs).
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B. The Constitutional.Arguments Against the Inclusion of Religious
Schools in School Voucher Programs
Although various scholars have made strong arguments in support of the
constitutionality of the inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs,"°
other scholars have presented Establishment Clause case law that addresses
aid to religious education and the Lemon test in a different light. These
scholars have contended that voucher programs which include religious
schools impermissibly aid such schools and that recent Supreme Court deci-
sions involving aid to religious education do not support such programs.3 'O
Scholars who oppose the inclusion of religious schools in voucher plans have
set forth five major arguments to support their contention that such programs
are unconstitutional.3"
First, scholars who oppose school vouchers have contended that any aid
to religious schools is per se invalid. 3 Second, some commentators have
looked to Nyquist as authority and have refuted the private choice theory that
other scholars have advocated." Third, scholars who have not supported the
inclusion of religious schools in voucher plans do not accept that Mueller,
Witters, and Zobrest clearly indicate that such voucher plans are constitu-
tional.30 5 Fourth, some scholars have looked to Grand Rapids as presenting
a strong argument against voucher systems that include religious schools.3
300. See supra notes 255-98 and accompanying text (presenting arguments in support of
inclusion of religious schools in school voucher programs).
301. See Bright, supra note 14, at 228 (asserting that aid provided to religious schools
through voucher programs is not permissible simply because parental choice directs aid); Green,
supra note 14, at 62-65 (contending that Mueller and Witters do not permit inclusion of relig-
ious schools in voucher programs); Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 14, at 6-10 (discussing recent
Supreme Court opinions involving aid to religious schools and determining that voucher plans
do not distribute aid neutrally when compared to other programs' distribution of aid in recent
cases).
302. See infra notes 303-30 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' arguments in
support of contention that inclusion of religious schools in school voucher programs is uncon-
stitutional).
303. See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 14, at 37 (concluding that "any money given to
[religious] schools has the primary effect of advancing religion" and violates separation of
church and state); infra notes 309-11 and accompanying text (discussing argument that all aid
to religious schools is invalid).
304. See Green, supra note 14, at 57-60 (arguing that private choice theory should be
struck down according to Nyquist and its companion case, Sloan); infra notes 312-18 and
accompanying text (discussing Nyquist and refuting private choice theory).
305. See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 14, at 7-9 (discussing other scholars' questionable
interpretation of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest); infra notes 319-22 (discussing voucher
opponents' interpretation of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest).
306. See Bright, supra note 14, at 217-18 (asserting that under Grand Rapids, school
SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS AND SECTARIAN SCHOOLS 765
Finally, and not surprisingly, opponents of the inclusion of religious schools
in voucher programs have contended that such programs fail the Lemon test."0
In sum, these scholars have asserted that the inclusion of religious schools in
voucher plans renders such plans unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause." 8
First, opponents of the inclusion of religious schools in voucher systems
have asserted that any amount of public funds given to religious schools,
regardless of their superficial channeling through parents, have the primary
effect of advancing religion and thus fail to maintain the separation between
church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause.3 Professor
Cynthia Bright has asserted that this failure to maintain such a separation is
a result of the religious indoctrination that inevitably exists at religious
schools and the religious mission that teachers intertwine with every aspect
of education." Voucher opponents also have argued that a court can distin-
guish cases such as Witters and Zobrest from the school voucher situation
because the amount of aid that flows to religious schools as a result of voucher
programs creates an establishment of religion.'
Second, opponents of the inclusion of religious schools in voucher
systems also have refuted the private choice theory.1 The state's act of
voucher programs that involve religious schools serve to subsidize religion); infra notes 323-26
and accompanying text (discussing scholars' arguments regarding Grand Rapids).
307. See Weishaar, supra note 14, at 572 (concluding that voucher programs fail Lemon
test because they have impermissible effect of advancing religion); infra notes 327-30 and
accompanying text (explaining argument that voucher plans that include religious schools fail
Lemon test).
308. See Bright, supra note 14, at 228-29 (concluding that school voucher programs do
not avoid violating Constitution through notion of parental choice); Green, supra note 14, at
73 (concluding that voucher programs violate Establishment Clause); Loeb & Kaminer, supra
note 14, at 37 (concluding that school voucher programs that provide aid to religious schools
are unconstitutional); Weishaar, supra note 14, at 572-74 (concluding that voucher programs
that include religious schools violate Establishment Clause).
309. See Bright, supra note 14, at 209 (stating that Supreme Court has acknowledged that
when government aid reaches religious institutions, such aid raises Establishment Clause
concerns); Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 14, at 37 (concluding that "any money given to [relig-
ious] schools has the primary effect of advancing religion," even when funneled through
parental choice, and thus violates separation of church and state).
310. See Bright, supra note 14, at 209 (asserting that "[r]eligious indoctrination forms an
essential part of the curricula at religious schools, and the religious mission of religious
institutions permeates every aspect of education").
311. See id. at 218 (arguing that amount of aid that flows to religious schools as result of
school voucher programs can be important factor).
312. See id at228 (refuting private choice theory); Green, supra note 14, at 57-58 (arguing
that Court should strike down private choice theory according to Nyquist and its companion
case).
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giving parents the power to choose their children's schools, as a state does
when it implements a voucher program, does necessarily circumvent the
Establishment Clause because the state cannot delegate an action that it is
forbidden to take at all. 3 Professor Steven K. Green has contended that
Nyquist and its companion case should direct any inquiry into the constitution-
ality of private choice programs.31" Both cases involved programs that pro-
vided tax benefits or tuition reimbursements for parents who chose to send
their children to private schools." Professor Green has noted that the Court
struck down both programs as unconstitutional because they had the imper-
missible effect of advancing religion."" Nyquist asserts that the disbursement
of funds through parents has the same effect as the direct disbursement of
funds. 7 Therefore, private choice is insignificant and does not make a
voucher program that distributes funds through parents valid.'
Third, unlike the scholars who argue for the inclusion of religious
schools in voucher programs, scholars who oppose such programs have not
accepted that Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest are clear indications that vouchers
are constitutional. 9 Some scholars have pointed out that besides the neutral
availability of the aid and the element of private choice in both the Mueller
and Witters programs, the Supreme Court considered other factors, such as the
fact that the programs did not involve outright grants, which the Court would
not have deemed constitutional.32 Also, some scholars have determined that
Zobrest does not support the school voucher argument because the opinion
relies on the neutrality of the service and the absence of any mention of
religion in the IDEA, which created the aid.32' Voucher programs, on the
other hand, do not provide a neutral service in that they expressly send stu-
313. See Bright, supra note 14, at 228 (asserting that "[p]rivate choice theory flounders"
in assuming that giving individuals power to choose school to which it will send state funds will
avoid conflict with Establishment Clause because "state cannot delegate an action it cannot
take").
314. Green, supra note 14, at 57.
315. See id. at 57-58 (summarizing facts of Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825
(1973)).
316. See id at58 (discussingwhy Courtstruckdown programs in bothNyquistandSloan).
317. See id at 59-60 (asserting thatNyquist shows that disbursing benefits through parents
is not different from directly disbursing benefits).
318. See id. at59 (statingthatCourtinNyquistimpliesthatprogramviolatesEstablishment
Clause regardless of whether actual funds ever reach sectarian schools and rule applies to all
types of grants).
319. See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 14, at 7-9 (discussing other scholars' questionable
interpretation of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest).
320. See id. at 8 (noting that in Mueller, Justice Rehnquist expressed doubts about consti-
tutionality of "outright grants to low-income parents").
321. See id. at 9-10 (asserting that Zobrest involves neutral statute).
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dents to religious schools, if the students so choose, and therefore contain a
bias toward religion."
Fourth, Professor Bright has asserted that the strongest argument against
school voucher systems follows the reasoning of the Court in GrandRapids3"
In Grand Rapids, the Court held that two programs through which the state
provided teachers and classes to nonpublic school students were unconstitu-
tional 24 According to Grand Rapids, a benefit to a religious school is
indistinguishable from a direct grant of aid because, regardless of how the
school received the aid, that aid relieved the school of otherwise necessary
costs and thereby allowed additional expenditure of funds for religious
purposes.3" Under this analysis, voucher programs would provide indirect aid
to schools and would similarly subsidize their religious function by dispersing
funds for the benefit of sectarian activities. Therefore, it would violate the
Establishment Clause.326
Finally, other scholars have contended that a school voucher program that
includes religious schools might very well fail the Lemon test. 27 A voucher
program might have trouble passing the effects prong if the program does not
have a genuine element of private choice because the program has limited
nonsectarian opportunities to use school vouchers 2 ' Also, scholars note that
voucher programs which provide aid to religious schools may not pass the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test. 9 Religious schools are pervasively
sectarian, thus making it impossible for a state to have a nonentangling aid
program because a school could not separate out its secular activities from the
other activities of the school for the purpose of receiving funding 3
322. See id. (asserting that school voucher programs are "heavily skewed towards religion"
and therefore not comparable to aid program in Zobrest).
323. See Bright, supra note 14, at217 (asserting that strongest argument against California
school voucher system is Court's reasoning in Grand Rapids). Although Professor Bright
specifically addresses a voucher program that the California state legislature proposed, her
arguments pertain to school voucher programs in general. She asserts that the California
program is one of many that legislatures are proposing across the nation. Id at 194-96.
324. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985).
325. See Bright, supra note 14, at 217-18 (discussing Court's reasoning in GrandRapids).
326. See id. (asserting that under Grand Rapids, school voucher programs serve to sub-
sidize religion).
327. See Weishaar, supra note 14, at561-70 (assessing school voucher programs according
to Lemon test and p ointing outhow voucherprogramsthatinclude religious scho ols can fail test).
328. See id at 565-66 (noting that if aid recipient only has limited number of choices,
recipient may have to choose religious education and will not have made independent choice).
329. See id. at 569 (asserting that difficulties arise when assessing school voucher pro-
grams under entanglement prong of Lemon test).
330. See id. (determining that religious schools are pervasively sectarian and cannot easily
distinguish secular functions for purposes of separate funding).
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Scholars cannot fully assess the constitutionality of including religious
schools in school voucher programs under the Lemon test, however, without
another look at the Court's recent decision in Agostini.331 In Agostini, the
Court altered its application of the Lemon test and emphasized certain points
that it had made in earlier opinions . 3 2 At least to some degree, the Supreme
Court's recent Agostini decision affected much of what scholars have said
about school voucher programs.
C. The Application ofAgostini to the Constitutional Arguments For
andAgainst the Inclusion of Religious Schools in School Voucher Programs
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Agostini altered the applica-
tion of the Lemon test to the question of whether a government program can
aid religious institutions. The Court also determined that Witters and Zobrest
had contributed to a significant change in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence.333 The Court's decision inAgostini lends support to many of the ideas
that scholars have set forth in support of the inclusion of religious schools in
school voucher programs. It also eliminates many of the arguments that
scholars make asserting that the inclusion of religious schools in school
voucher programs is unconstitutional.
Agostini emphasized the notion that a program is constitutional if it
provides aid to a class of students on a neutral basis and if that aid reaches
religious schools only as a result of the independent and private choice of the
individual.334 The Court relied on Witters and Zobrest in its decision in
Agostini, departing from its previous rule that all government funds that
directly aid the function of religious schools are invalid.33 This is similar to
the contention that many school voucher advocates have raised - that the
principles of neutrality developed inMueller, Witters, and Zobrest support the
constitutionality of voucher programs.33 6 Those scholars who have refuted the
331. See infra notes 333-57 and accompanying text (analyzing Agostini in light of school
voucher programs).
332. See supra notes 157-204 and accompanying text (discussing Agostini and its impact
on Lemon test and various Supreme Court decisions).
333. Seesupranotes 157-204 andaccompanyingtext (discussing Supreme Court's changes
to Establishment Clause jurisprudence through its decision inAgostini).
334. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2011-12 (1997) (asserting that Court has
"departed from the rule... that all government aid that directly aids the educational function
of religious schools is invalid" because, in Witters and Zobrest, government distributed aid on
neutral basis and recipient used aid at religious school only as result of private choice).
335. Id. at2011.
336. Seesupranotes271-91 and accompanyingtext(discussing scholars'views onMueller,
Witters, and Zobrest and how these decisions support constitutionality of including religious
schools in voucher programs).
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private choice theory and assert that private choice has the same effect as the
direct disbursement of funds, however, do not get any support from
Agostini. 3 The Court's decision follows from the reasoning in Witters and
Zobrest that the element of private choice prevents aid to religious schools
from being attributed to government decisionmaking. 38
Some opponents of school vouchers have asserted that if any amount of
public funds reach religious schools, that aid has the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion.339 The Supreme Court used this reasoning in Grand Rapids.34
Professor Bright has asserted that according to that decision, a benefit to a
religious school is indistinguishable from a grant of direct aid because the aid
simply frees up funds for sectarian use, therefore rendering vouchers just
another form of invalid direct aid." The Court in Agostini, however, over-
ruled parts of GrandRapids, including the notion that all government aid that
directly aids the function of religious schools is invalid and has the primary
effect of advancing religion. 2
Most importantly, the Court's decision inAgostini significantly alters the
Lemon test and therefore discredits any argument that the inclusion of reli-
gious schools in school voucher programs is unconstitutional because it fails
the Lemon test. 3 First, in cases prior toAgostini, the Court found the secular
purpose prong to be of little importance when addressing aid to religious
schools and therefore it has readily found a secular purpose in all such
cases.3' " The Court in Agostini did not alter the first prong in any way; it
merely acknowledged that it had been addressed in the Grand Rapids deci-
337. See supra notes 293-98 and accompanying text (discussing school voucher oppo-
nents' arguments that aid that reaches religious schools as result of private choice is no different
from aid distributed directly).
338. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011-12 (affirming that private choice present in Witters
and Zobrest caused Court to depart from rule that all government funds that aids function of
religious schools is invalid).
339. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing school voucher opponents'
contention that any amount of funds reaching religious school has primary effect of advancing
religion).
340. See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text (discussing Court's reasoning in
Grand Rapids).
341. See Bright, supra note 14 (asserting thatunder GrandRapids, any benefit to religious
school is indistinguishable from direct aid, and therefore vouchers constitute direct aid).
342. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2011 (1997). The Court stated that "we have
departed from the rule... that all government aid that directly aids the educational function of
religious schools is invalid." Id
343. See supra notes 327-3 0 and accompanying text (noting that scholars have contended
that school voucher program that includes religious schools might fail Lemon test).
344. See Stick, supra note 14, at 434 (asserting that Court has always found secular
purpose in programs that provide aid to religious schools).
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sion.34 School voucher programs have a valid secular purpose in that they
seek to improve the quality of education and provide opportunities for all
children, despite their income level."
Second, according to the Court in Agostini, a government program that
provides aid to religious education can satisfy the effects prong if the program
distributes aid on a neutral basis.347 The Court reinforced the idea of neutral-
ity by referring back to the neutrality of the programs that the Court upheld in
Witters and Zobrest"4 When the government allocates aid on a neutral basis,
without reference to religion, and makes it available to all beneficiaries, the
aid does not have the primary effect of advancing religion. 49 The Court noted
that, in both Witters and Zobrest, aid was allocated to all eligible beneficiaries
based on their handicap, without regard to religion.35 ° It recognized that in
Grand Rapids and Aguilar, the Court mistakenly had not considered that the
programs at issue provided aid on a neutral basis.3 5' Therefore, a school
voucher program that distributes aid on a neutral basis, without regard to
religious preferences, would not create an incentive for a student to pursue a
religious education and thus would not advance religion.
Third, the Court in Agostini makes it clear that the effects prong sub-
sumes the entanglement prong, and therefore the entanglement prong is of
little importance when assessing a school voucher program. 52 The Court
determined that the factors it used in assessing both the second and third
prongs of the Lemon test were substantially the same.353 Therefore, it was
easiest to consider a statute's entanglement as an aspect of that statute's
effect.354 Also, the Agostini Court overruled Aguilar and parts of Grand
345. SeeAgostini, 117S. Ct. at2008 (noting that Courthad found program to have secular
purpose in Grand Rapids).
346. See Stick, supra note 14, at 435 (asserting that attempt to improve quality of educa-
tion is enough to satisfy secular purpose prong of Lemon test); Nasstrom, supra note 14, at 1092
(asserting that vouchers have secular purpose of"improving education through parental choice
and increased competition among schools").
347. See supranotes 334-38 (discussingAgostini and emphasis on neutrally allocated aid).
348. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2014 (1997) (stating that when "aid is
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is
made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis," no




352. See id. at 2015 (discussing factors used to assess effects prong and assess entangle-
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Rapids because the assumptions it previously relied upon in determining that
the government aid programs had the primary effect of advancing religion
were now invalid. 55 The entanglement prong disappears even when a govern-
ment program provides aid to religious schools because the Court no longer
presumes that the program has the primary effect of advancing religion. 56 In
Agostini, the Court found that the monitoring of New York City's Title I
program caused the religious institution and the government to communicate
extensively, which created an excessive entanglement the Court deemed
unnecessary because it did not presume the program to advance religion. 57
Therefore, a voucher system that distributes public funds to religious schools,
but that does not have the primary effect of advancing religion because it
allocates funds on a neutral basis, does not have to undergo a separate test for
excessive entanglement.
D. School Voucher Programs and the Inclusion of Religious Schools
After Agostini, school voucher programs that include religious schools
pass the revised Lemon test.35 The Court's decision in Agostini also rein-
forces the concepts of neutrality that many scholars address as they argue that
the inclusion of religious schools in voucher programs is constitutional.359
The Court developed these concepts of neutrality in Witters and Zobrest, cases
in which government programs allocated funds on a neutral basis and distrib-
uted aid to a religious school only after an individual made a private choice.36°
The Court in Agostini upheld these two cases361 and overruled Aguilar and
355. Seeid. at2015-16 (describingassumptions and explaininghowtheyhavebeen under-
mined).
356. See id. (asserting that Court's finding inAguilar thatNew York City's Title I program
resulted in excessive entanglement rested on now-invalid presumption thatprogram had primary
effect of advancing religion).
357. See id (asserting that New York City's Title I program was no longer presumed to
advance religion because three underlying assumptions had been abandoned in subsequent
Supreme Court opinions, and therefore did not require pervasive monitoring that would
constitute excessive entanglement).
358. See supra notes 343-57 and accompanying text (explaining three prongs of Lemon
test and how school voucher program passes each part of test).
359. See supra notes 334-38 and accompanying text (discussing how Court's decision in
Agostini emphasized neutrality concepts developed in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest).
360. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (describing
neutrality of program in that state distributes benefits without regard to religion and parents
have freedom to choose school at which to use benefits); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,488 (1986) (describing neutral aspects of Washington's program,
such as element of private choice and program's availability to all eligible persons without
regard to religion).
361. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2011-16 (1997) (relying on reasoning of
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parts of Grand Rapids,362 dispensing with the idea that all government aid that
directly benefits a religious school is invalid. 63 Therefore, a school voucher
program that includes religious schools is constitutional if it allocates aid on
a neutral basis and distributes public funds to a religious school after a family
makes a private and independent decision, just as the programs upheld in
Witters and Zobrest did.
The voucher programs in both Cleveland and Milwaukee allocate funds
on a neutral basis because each program provides aid to students with parents
at low-income levels, without regard to their religious preferences.3" Also,
the students who participate in both the Cleveland and Milwaukee programs
choose the school they wish to attend, and public funds do not reach a reli-
gious school until the student makes an independent choice and the parent
signs the check. 65 When the Supreme Court of Ohio considers Cleveland's
voucher program, the reasoning of Agostini should be considered and the
program upheld as constitutional. Also, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
already has recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in Agostini has an
impact on the issue of school voucher programs, as that court decided to
uphold Milwaukee's Parental Choice Program.3"
In assessing the constitutionality of the inclusion of religious schools in
the Milwaukee program, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the
Supreme Court's opinion in Agostini and how that Court explained that the
understanding of the criteria used to evaluate the Establishment Clause inquiry
had changed in recent years. 67 The Jackson court acknowledged theAgostini
Court's view that the unchanged principle under the Establishment Clause is
neutrality and decided to follow the three criteria set forth in Agostini for
evaluating whether a program has an "impermissible effect." '368 The court in
Jackson determined that the inclusion of religious schools in the Milwaukee
Court in Witters and Zobrest in undermining previously believed assumptions and overruling
Aguilar and parts of Grand Rapids).
362. See id. at 2016 (stating that Court can recognize change in law and overrule Aguilar
and inconsistent portions of Grand Rapids).
363. See id. at 2011 (stating that Court has "departed from the rule ... that all government
aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools is invalid").
364. See supra notes 231, 239-40 and accompanying text (describing income-based
eligibility for Cleveland and Milwaukee scholarship programs).
365. Seesupranotes233-34,241-42 andaccompanyingtext(statingthatinboth Cleveland
and Milwaukee programs, family chooses school that student will attend and then signs check
over to school).
366. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998) (concluding that Milwau-
kee program does not violate Establishment Clause or Wisconsin Constitution), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
367. Id. at 616.
368. Id, at 617.
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program did not (1) result in governmental indoctrination, (2) define its
recipients by reference to religion, or (3) create an excessive entanglement
underAgostini.69 After applying to the Milwaukee program the criteria that
the Supreme Court developed in Establishment Clause cases up to Agostini,
the Jackson court concluded that the program provides aid to both sectarian
and nonsectarian schools on the basis of neutral, secular criteria only as a
result of numerous private choices of individual parents."' It is "precisely
such a program" that the Supreme Court meant to protect.
371
A city or state, however, could choose to implement a school voucher
program that does not include religious schools and such a program would
withstand constitutional scrutiny. A state legislature does not implement a
school voucher plan out of necessity and, therefore, the child benefit theory
discussed in Part I.F that mandates the inclusion of religious schools in need-
based interdistrict choice programs does not apply to voucher programs. 372 As
discussed in Parts I and II, Maine's interdistrict choice program has been
operating for many years and is a necessary solution to the problem faced by
the state's rural areas that do nothave enough residents to support a secondary
school.373 Although largely implemented in Cleveland and Milwaukee to
provide educational opportunities to low-income students, voucher programs
are not entirely need-based. The Ohio and Wisconsin state legislatures began
these programs because the public schools in Cleveland and Milwaukee are
not of high quality374 and few low-income families can afford private
schools. 375 They are not need-based, however, in the sense that the children
who participate would have other educational options, such as attending
public school, without the voucher program.
1V. Conclusion
The opinions of the Supreme Court and its interpretations of the contro-
versial Lemon test have changed Establishment Clause jurisprudence regard-




372. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (explaining child benefit theory and
how it applies to situations in which government aid is need-based).
373. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text (describing Maine's interdistrict choice
program).
374. See ALAN BONSTEEL & CALos A. BONILLA, A CHOICEFOR OUR CHILDREN: CURING
THECRISiS INAMEICA'S SCHOOLS 40 (1997) (stating that Cleveland and Milwaukee are among
cities where "schools are so bad that public school teachers send their own children to private
schools").
375. Id. at 92 (asserting that "few low-income families can now afford private schools").
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had a significant impact on this change in jurisprudence. Under the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the Establishment Clause, Maine courts
should rule in favor of the Bagleys because the change in jurisprudence not
only permits but also requires the inclusion of religious schools in necessary
interdistrict school choice programs. However, on April 20, 1998, the Cum-
berland County Superior Court concluded that the denial of tuition funds to
the Bagleys does not violate the Establishment Clause or any other provision
of the United States or Maine Constitutions. 76 The trial court, however,
dedicates only two sentences of analysis to the Supreme Court's changing
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and mentions Agostini only in a cita-
tion.377 The court does not elaborate on the Supreme Court's current interpre-
tation of the Establishment Clause following its decision inAgostini.378 When
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the Milwaukee program in light
of Agostini and other Establishment Clause case law, it reversed the state
court of appeals's decision that had not relied on the most recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence. It seems that if the state court of appeals hears this case
and actually applies recent Establishment Clause case law, a different out-
come might result.
Agostini has impacted scholars' arguments in support of and in opposi-
tion to the constitutionality of including religious schools in school voucher
programs. Agostini makes it clear that school voucher programs that include
religious schools are constitutional, as evidenced in the decision of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court. Establishment Clause jurisprudence, however, does
not require that voucher programs include religious schools. Therefore, a
Bagley-like lawsuit would not be successful in a state that has implemented
a school voucher system that excludes religious schools; but, when a state
chooses to include nonsectarian private schools in a necessary interdistrict
school choice program, that state must extend its program to religious private
schools as well.
376. Bagley v. Maine Dep't of Educ., No. CV-97-484, slip op. at 4 (Cumberland Sup. Ct.
Apr. 20, 1998) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
377. Id at 3.
378. Id at 3-4.
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